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II. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to decide this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(h) and Rule
3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

III.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES.

All issues on appeal involve the trial court's legal
conclusions;

this Court reviews those conclusions for legal

correctness without deference.

Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552 (Utah

Ct. App. 1994) . This review is of a summary judgment, so the
facts and reasonable inferences from those facts are construed in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Hultgren. 860 P.2d 916, 917 (Utah 1993).

Andreini v.

This appeal raises the

following issues:
1.

Did the trial court err in determining as a matter of

law against disputed facts that appellant was or reasonably
should have been aware of the facts underlying her causes of
action from the time she was aware L.D.S. Social Services (Social
Services) had taken her son for adoption placement instead of
from the time she became aware that Social Services took her
adoption consent when she lacked the capacity to give it?
5

That issue was preserved in the District Court by the
following:
a.

Appellees' motion for summary judgment and

memorandum, Record on Appeal, pp. 199-201 & 206-41;
b.

Appellant's memorandum in opposition, Record on

Appeal, pp. 257-86/
c.

Appellees' reply memorandum, Record on Appeal, pp.

d.

Hearing of the motion, Record on Appeal, pp. 386-

e.

The District Court's Order and Judgment, Record on

351-62;

91; and

Appeal, pp. 369-71.
2.

Did the trial court err in not allowing plaintiff to

amend her complaint to substitute certain doe defendants' true
names as learned in discovery, to present a more clear statement
of plaintiff's case and to provide appellees better notice of
appellant's claims to allow appellees to respond better?
That issue was preserved in the District Court by the
following:
a.

Appellant's motion for permission to amend,

memorandum, and proposed second amended complaint, Record on
Appeal, pp. 143-47;
b.

Appellees' memorandum in opposition, Record on

Appeal, pp. 148-55;
6

c.

Appellant's reply memorandum, Record on Appeal,

pp. 156-94.
d.

The District Court's February 20, 1996, minute

entry ruling, Record on Appeal, pp. 197-98/
e.

and

The District Court's March 26, 1996, order, Record

on Appeal, pp. 244-45.

IV.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES.

The addendum contains copies of the following statutes:
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25(3)
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23(2)

V.

STATEMENT OP THE CASE.

Appellant brought her complaint on May 20, 1993.

On

February 27, 1995, she brought an amended complaint alleging four
causes of action against appellees and a number of defendants
named by the fictitious name Doe for negligence, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, constructive fraud and breach
of contract.

Appellant brought a motion for permission to bring

a second amended complaint which appellees opposed and the
District Court denied.

Appellees brought a motion for summary

judgment against the amended complaint, alleging in relevant part
that statutes of limitation in Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-14-4(1), 7812-25(3) and 78-12-23(2) barred appellant's claims.
7

The District

Court, by Judge Kenneth Rigtrup, ruled that Utah Code Ann. §7814-1, et seq.,

the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, did not

apply but "by any applicable statute of limitations, the case on
all causes of action is time-barred..."

Record on Appeal, pg.

391.

VI.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

The following facts were undisputed and taken as true for
purposes of defendants' motion for summary judgment:
1.

In January, 1967, appellant was 23 years old, a

graduate student at Illinois Teacher's College -- Chicago North
(now Northeastern illinois University) and pregnant from an
acquaintance rape. Appellant's Aff. \2,

Record on Appeal, pg.

287.
2. From 1967 to the present, appellant has been a member of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (the Church).
Appellant's Aff. f3, Record on Appeal pg. 287.
3.

Appellant desired to obtain the Church's advice

regarding her pregnancy.

She obtained that advice from the

Church's Relief Society, predecessor in interest to defendant
Social Services (together referred to as "Social Services").
Social Services instructed her it was Church counsel that she
would ruin the child's life if she did anything other than submit

8

the child to Social Services for adoption placement. Appellant's
Aff. 14, Record on Appeal pg. 288.
4.

During January, 1967, Social Services employed Gladys

Carling as a case worker.

Carling Aff. %A. Record on Appeal pg.

306.
5.

As a regular part of her case worker duties, Mrs.

Carling obtained consents to adopt according to the following
procedure:
a*

Usually she would meet with the birth mother

before the birth mother entered the hospital.
b.

Mrs. Carling would inform the hospital the mother

was under Social Services' jurisdiction, request that the
hospital inform her when the birth occurred, and request that the
hospital not publish the birth otherwise.
c.

The hospital would inform Mrs. Carling of the

birth and of the mother's and child's general condition.
d.

If there was no urgency regarding the mother's or

child's health, Mrs. Carling would visit the mother one or two
days after the birth.
e.

If the birth mother desired to relinquish the

child, Mrs. Carling obtained her consent on the standard form
release which L.D.S. Social Services used at the time.
f.

In accord with Social Services' policy:

9

i.

Mrs. Carling was the only witness to the

birth mother's execution of the release;
ii.
iii.

Mrs. Carling acted as notary;
Mrs. Carling

and,

did not review the birth

mother's medical records or otherwise inquire about the birth
mother's physical or mental capacity.
Carling Aff. Hi, Record on Appeal pp. 306-07.
6.

Mrs. Carling met appellant several times between

November, 1966, and January, 1967. Carling Aff. \2,

Record on

Appeal pg. 308.
7.

As of those meetings, appellant had not decided to

relinquish the child.
8.

Carling Aff. i|3, Record on Appeal pg. 308.

In those meetings, Mrs. Carling noticed appellant was

outspoken, direct and capable of forming her own opinion. Carling
Aff. 1(4, Record on Appeal pg. 308.
9.

Appellant entered St. Benedict's Hospital (the

Hospital) on January 14, 1967, and gave birth to a healthy son.
Appellant's Aff. %5, Record on Appeal, pg. 288.
10.

Immediately after appellant gave birth and throughout

her Hospital stay,

her physician directed the hospital to

administer the antipsychotic drug Thorazine.

Appellant's Aff.

17, Record on Appeal pg. 288.
11.

The Thorazine incapacitated appellant physically,

mentally, emotionally and spiritually10

The Thorazine completely

removed from appellant the maternal instinct which would have
prompted her to keep her child and removed from appellant her
ability to obtain personal revelation and spiritual guidance. At
times appellant completely lost consciousness.

Appellant's Aff.

118, Record on Appeal pg. 2 88.
12.

Mrs. Carling met with appellant next on January 16,

1967, two days after appellant gave birth to her son.

Carling

Aff. %5, Record on Appeal pg. 308.
13.

Mrs. Carling noticed appellant was not herself.

Mrs.

Carling found appellant to be passive, indifferent and
unaffected. Carling Aff. ]6,
14.

Record on Appeal pg. 3 08.

Nonetheless, Mrs. Carling obtained appellant's consent,

took the baby with her and placed the baby in L.D.S. Social
Services' foster care.

Carling Aff. \l,

Record on Appeal pg.

308.
15.
records.
16.

Social Services had access to appellant's medical
Appellant's Aff. 1l0, Record on Appeal pg. 288.
As was her standard practice, Mrs. Carling recorded the

subject events on an audio tape.

Carling Aff. 18, Record on

Appeal pg. 308.
17.

In that recording, Mrs. Carling stated she believed

appellant was sedated at the time she gave her ostensible
consent.

Carling Aff. 1|9, Record on Appeal pg. 308.
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18.

Several times after her delivery, appellant expressed

to Mrs. Carling her confusion, remorse, heartache and void from
the loss of her child.

Carling Aff. ^10, Record on Appeal pg.

308;
19.

Appellant diligently inquired of Social Services

regarding the adoption and her son. Appellant's Aff. f26, Record
on Appeal pg. 291.
20.

For example, on January 18, 1967, appellant and her

mother visited Social Services to inquire about appellant's son
and the adoption and to inform Social Services of appellant's
sorrow, confusion and regret.

Social Services failed to inform

appellant of her incapacity and failed to provide any information
about how it had obtained appellant's consent. Appellant's Aff.
127, Record on Appeal pg. 291.
21.

After January 18, 1967, appellant inquired of Social

Services through its various agents approximately thirty more
times about her son and the adoption.

Social Services told

appellant it could give her no other information regarding the
adoption or her son. Appellant's Aff. 128, Record on Appeal pg.
291-92.
22.

Under Social Services' policy, Social Services would

not allow appellant or any birth mother to revoke her consent
based on remorse, grief, heartache, or void from the loss of the
child.

Carling Aff. Ill, Record on Appeal pg, 309.
12

23.

Appellant trusted the Church beyond question.

Her

trust and confidence in the Church removed from her any suspicion
that the Church acted wrongly in obtaining her consent.
Appellant's Aff. ^|12, Record on Appeal pg. 289.
24.

Appellant desired to be responsible for the costs of

her own and her child's care so on or about July 7, 1969, she
asked the hospital to provide her with her records so she could
pay for the costs she had incurred.

Appellant's Aff. 1|l3,

Record on Appeal pg. 289.
25.

The hospital responded as follows:
Since the records of our no information
maternity patients are destroyed, I can only
send you an estimated amount.

A correct copy of the hospital's reply is attached as
exhibit B to appellant's affidavit and appears at pg. 297 of the
record on appeal.

Appellant's Aff. Kl4, Record on Appeal pg.

289.
26.

From the Hospital's reply, appellant reasonably assumed

her records had been destroyed and she could have no access to
them.

Appellant's Aff. Kl5, Record on Appeal pg. 289.
27.

Over 23 years after the birth of her son, appellant and

her son were reunited.

Appellant's Aff. 1l6, Record on Appeal

pg. 289.
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28.

Appellant desired to obtain her son's medical records

and requested them from the Hospital on or about May 29, 1990.
Appellant's Aff. ^17, Record on Appeal pg. 289.
29.

In response to appellant's request, on or about May 29,

1990, the Hospital gave her copies not of her son's records as I
had requested but of her own records, which she reasonably had
assumed were destroyed.

Appellant's Aff. 1l8, Record on Appeal

pg. 289.
30.

On or about May 29, 1990, on receipt of her own medical

records, appellant learned for the first time she had been
drugged with Thorazine during her entire Hospital stay.
Appellant's Aff. i[l9, Record on Appeal pg. 290.
31.
release.

Social Services never had given appellant a copy of the
After she obtained her medical records, in or about

August, 1990, appellant visited Social Services to determine what
documentation, if any, Social Services had of the authority it
claimed in placing appellant's son for adoption.

Appellant then

obtained from Social Services a copy of the release.

A copy of

the release is attached to appellant's affidavit as exhibit A and
appears at page 294 of the record on appeal. Appellant's Aff.
f20, Record on Appeal pg. 290.
32.

By matching the release with her hospital records,

appellant discovered for the first time Social Services had
obtained her ostensible consent while appellant was incapacitated
14

from the effects of the drug Thorazine.

Appellant's Aff. ^[20,

Record on Appeal pg. 2 90.
33.

After learning she had signed the release while

incapacitated, appellant sought redress unceasingly for over two
years.
34.

Appellant's Aff. 1)21, Record on Appeal pg. 290.
Appellant pursued her claim through every level of

Church judiciary.

Appellant's Aff. J22f Record on Appeal pg.

290.
35.

Appellant issued the following correspondence, correct

copies of which are attached to appellant's affidavit as
designated:
a.

Appellant to Bishop Glenn L. Pace, Presiding

Bishop, 11/8/91, attached as exhibit C.
b.

Bishop Glenn L. Pace, Presiding Bishop, to

appellant, 11/18/91, attached as exhibit D.
c.

Appellant to Dr. Harold C. Brown, Director of

Social Services, 12/6/91, attached as exhibit E.
d.

Dr. Harold C. Brown, Director of Social Services,

to appellant, 12/19/91, attached as exhibit F.
e.

Appellant to Bishop Glenn L. Pace, Presiding

Bishop, 1/3/92, attached as exhibit G.
f.

Appellant to Bishop Glenn L. Pace, Presiding

Bishop, 1/6/92, attached as exhibit H.
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g.

Bishop Glenn L. Pace, Presiding Bishop, to

appellant, 2/12/92, attached as exhibit I.
Appellant's Aff. ^23, Record on Appeal pg. 290.
36.

Appellant sought audience with Church authority at

every available level, including her Bishop, Stake President,
Regional Representative, Area President and, finally, the
Presiding Bishop. Appellant's Aff. 124, Record on Appeal pg. 291.
37.

Painfully, appellant last resorted to this lawsuit,

having exhausted all remedies within the Church. Appellant's Aff.
f25, Record on Appeal pg. 291.

VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.
I.

APPEAL OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER PARAGRAPHS 2 THROUGH 7
REGARDING STATUTES OF LIMITATION.

A.

Appellant's claims are timely. The claims accrued when she
discovered the legal cause of her injury.
The limitation period applicable to a cause of action begins

to run when the cause of action accrues. Merkley v. Beaslin. 778
P.2d 16, 18 (Utah App. 1989);

Utah Code Ann. §78-12-1.

Appellant's causes of action accrued when she discovered the
facts underlying her causes of action. Her causes of action
accrued when she discovered Social Services took her ostensible
consent while she lacked the capacity to give it.
Appellant proposed the discovery rule and the District Court
tacitly ruled it did not apply.

The mere language of the

District Court's ruling reveals its error in determining whether
16

to apply the discovery rule.

The court ordered "Plaintiff knew

of her injury, the loss of her child, upon leaving the hospital
in 1967, and her cause of action accrued at that time."
on Appeal, pg. 370.

Record

But the District Court failed to distinguish

between appellant's physical injury, the loss of her son, and
appellant's legal injury, Social Services' taking of appellant's
consent when she lacked the capacity to give it.

Until 1990,

when by coincidence appellant discovered the medical records she
though had been destroyed, appellant did not and reasonably could
not know of the facts underlying her causes of action.

She did

not and reasonably could not know the circumstances under which
Social Services derived her flawed consent.
Because appellant was unaware of and reasonably could not
have discovered the facts underlying her causes of action, the
discovery rule applies to toll the applicable statutes of
limitation.

Here: 1) it would be irrational or unjust to

consider appellant's causes of action to have accrued at the time
she lost her son;

and 2) the limitation period is tolled by the

defendants' concealment.

1.

Rational and just application of the statutes.

To determine whether it is rational and just to bar the
claim, the Court balances

"the hardship the statute of

limitations would impose on the appellant in the circumstances of
the case outweighed any prejudice to the defendant from
17

difficulties of proof caused by the passage of time."
Rightly. 791 P.2d 868, 872 (Utah 1990) citing
87.

Klinaer v.

Myers. 635 P.2d at

Here, considering plaintiff's cause of action to have

accrued when Social Services took her child, instead of when she
discovered their misconduct, is irrational and unjust and will
work an ultimate hardship on her.

In contrast, it will cause no

prejudice to appellees.

I

To consider appellant's actions to have accrued when she
executed the release will impose on appellant complete hardship;
it will dispose of her claims before they accrued.
no knowledge or notice of defendants' misconduct.
no longer had her son.

She knew of her grief.

bewilderment and despair.

Appellant had
She knew she

She knew of her

But all appellant's sorrow and

confusion would not persuade Social Services to let appellant
void the contract.

She had no claim to bring until she learned

she had given her consent while incapacitated.
In contrast, to consider appellant's claims to have accrued
when appellant became aware of appellee's misconduct will cause
defendants no prejudice.

Appellees' arguments of prejudice are

unsupported by and contrary to the uncontroverted facts.
Appellees offer just bare, unsupported arguments of prejudice
unsupported by the record.

The present lawsuit is preserved well

and can be presented well.

To allow it will give appellant her

rightful day in court and will do defendants no injustice.

18

Appellant's cause of action accrued and the limitation
period began to run when appellant first was able to discover the
legal cause of her injury.
irrelevant.

The date of her physical injury is

Appellant's action accrued in August, 1990, and she

filed timely in May, 1993.

19

2.

Appellees' concealment.

Limitation periods are tolled while a defendant conceals a
claim.

Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45 (Utah 1996).

The rule

applies on appellant's prima facie showing of fraudulent
concealment and demonstration that given the defendant's actions
a reasonable plaintiff would not have discovered her claim
earlier.

Berenda, 914 P.2d at 53.

"The application of this

legal rule to any particular set of facts is necessarily a matter
left to trial courts and finders of fact."
Here, Gladys S. Carling, the Social Services employee who
took appellant's consent, was aware appellant was sedated and
affected when she obtained appellant's release.

Mrs. Carling

officially recorded her perception that appellant was sedated and
affected so Social Services shared Mrs. Carling7s awareness.
Mrs. Carling also acted as the only witness to the transaction
and as notary.

Social Services maintained to itself sole control

of the transaction and of all information surrounding the
transaction.

Appellant had no memory of executing the release.

After the adoption, appellant diligently inquired of Social
Services regarding the adoption and her son. Although aware of
appellant's flawed consent, Social Services told appellant they
could give her no other information regarding the adoption or her
son.

Social Services would not give appellant a copy of the

release until August, 1990, after appellant confronted Social
Services with the medical records which revealed her incapacity.
20

Given the appellees' actions appellant acted reasonably and
could not have discovered her claim earlier.
P.2d at 53.

See Berenda, 914

Appellant inquired diligently of Social Services.

She reasonably believed her medical records had been destroyed.
But there is more.

Appellant had trust and confidence in Social

Services as an agent of the Church to which she was and remains
devoted.

Although she was hurt and confused, her faith in the

Church removed any suspicion of wrongdoing.

It never would have

occurred to her that her Church would avail itself of her
incapacity.

Social Services' extraordinary influence overcame

the instinct she otherwise would have had to inquire into any
wrongdoing.

That influence never waned.

Appellants had a duty

to disclose to appellant material facts regarding the transaction
or facts exclusively in defendants' control.

But in spite of

ample opportunity, defendants' concealed from defendant that the
release was flawed.

She did not and could not know of her claims

until fate gave her the knowledge Social Services would not.
Against the background of appellees' concealment, appellant
reasonably could not have discovered her claims any sooner.
Appellant's cause of action accrued and the limitation period
began to run when appellant first was able to discover the legal
cause of her injury.

Appellant's action accrued in August, 1990,

and she filed timely in May, 1993•

21

B.

The District Court granted summary judgment although there
are material facts in dispute.
The District Court's granted summary judgment in the face of

numerous core issues which properly are questions of fact for the
jury and as to each of which appellant offered substantial
evidence to place the issue in dispute, as follows:
1.

When appellant knew or with reasonable diligence should

have known of the facts underlying her causes of action so to
commence running of the statute of limitations.
2.

The point at which appellant reasonably should have

known that she had suffered a legal injury so to commence running
of the limitation period.
3.

The reasonableness of appellant's efforts to discover

her legal injury.
4.

Whether appellees' concealment of her claims tolled

statutes of limitations.
5.

The existence of a confidential relationship.

The District Court improperly denied appellant her day in
court to resolve those factual issues.

Paragraphs 2 through 7 of

the District Court's summary judgment order must be reversed.

C.

The summary judgment order erroneously relies on
evidence of issues not properly before the court.
The issues of appellant's contractual capacity and of the

release's validity or invalidity were not before the District
Court.

The validity or invalidity of appellant's consent was not
22

properly before the District Court and cannot be the basis for
its ruling.

At the very least, the matter of appellant's

capacity remains in dispute as a question of fact for the
District Court to consider on proper proof.

Based on the

inappropriate finding that appellant had contractual capacity,
paragraphs 2 through 7 of the summary judgment order are flawed
and cannot endure.

II.

THE ORDER DISALLOWING THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT.
Appellant moved for permission to file a second amended

complaint to substitute certain doe defendants' true names as
learned in discovery, to present a more clear statement of
plaintiff's case and to provide appellees better notice of
appellant's claims to allow appellees to respond better.
A.

Amendments should be allowed liberally.
To properly frame the issues, to allow the parties a fair

opportunity to present their claims, and to assure that trials
conform to and include all relevant facts and applicable law,
courts liberally should allow the parties to amend their
pleadings.
B.

The amendment should be allowed to substitute certain doe
defendants' names as learned in discovery.
Plaintiff fashioned her second amended complaint based on

the information defendants provided in discovery regarding
certain defendants' roles and identities.
23

Based on that

information she substituted certain doe defendants' true names.
When appellant learned the doe defendants' true names, Rule
9(a)(2) mandated she amend her complaint to name them.

The

District Court erred in disallowing that mandatory amendment.
C.

The amendment would not prejudice the appellees•
The amendment's factual matter was based on information

defendants provided in discovery so they must already have notice
of it. The amendment added no new causes of action.

The

appellees cannot complain they would have an inadequate
opportunity "to meet the newly raised matter," factual or legal.
The District Court should have allowed the amendment.

It's

order denying appellant permission to amend is in error and
should be reversed.

VII.

CONCLUSION.

Appellant's cause of action accrued and the limitation
period began to run when appellant first was able to discover the
legal cause of her injury. Appellant's action accrued in August,
1990, and she filed timely in May, 1993. The District Court
improperly denied appellant her day in court to resolve factual
issues necessary to a proper ruling.

It's improper determination

of those fact issues included inappropriate findings on issues
not properly before the District Court. Paragraphs 2 through 7 of
the District Court's summary judgment order must be reversed.
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The District Court also disallowed a second amended
complaint to substitute certain doe defendants' true names as
learned in discovery, to present a more clear statement of
plaintiff's case and to provide appellees better notice of
appellant's claims to allow appellees to respond better.
District Court should have allowed the amendment.

The

The District

Court's order denying appellant permission to amend is in error
and should be reversed.
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VIII. ARGUMENT.
I.

APPEAL OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER PARAGRAPHS 2 THROUGH 7
REGARDING STATUTES OF LIMITATION.
The District Court ruled:
The Court finds, as a matter of law from the facts
stated herein, that she knew that she was injured once
she had her full faculties following the birth of the
child; that she didn't take steps to reasonably
discover what, if any, the cause of any incapacity was.
The Court finds that, by any applicable statute of
limitations, the case on all causes of action is time
barred; and is dismissed, accordingly, with prejudice.

Record on Appeal, pp. 3 90-91.

Based on that ruling, the

District Court ordered as follows:
(2) Plaintiff's tort claims are barred by the
statute of limitations in U.C.A. §78-12-25(3), and
plaintiff's contract claims is barred by the statute of
limitations in U.C.A. §78-12-23(2).
(3) Plaintiff knew of her injury, the loss of her
child, upon leaving the hospital in 1967, and her cause
of action accrued at that time.
j
(4) The administration of Thorazine was
reasonably discoverable by plaintiff within the
limitations period following her release from the
hospital, but plaintiff failed to take reasonable steps
to discover the cause of her alleged incapacity?
(5) Plaintiff was on notice to inquire about the
circumstances surrounding the taking of her consent
because, as she alleged, "not a day has passed since
January, 1967, that plaintiff has not felt the deep
heartache and void for the loss of her child and the
loss of the joys of motherhood."
(6) Plaintiff's action is time barred under any
applicable statute of limitation, and her Amended
Complaint is accordingly dismissed with prejudice.
(7)
granted.

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is
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Record on Appeal, pg. 3 70.
Appellant appeals from those paragraphs of the District
Court's order by presenting to this Court the following issue:
Did the trial court err in determining as a matter
of law against disputed facts that appellant was or
reasonably should have been aware of the facts
underlying her causes of action from the time she was
aware Social Services had taken her son for adoption
placement instead of from the time she became aware
that Social Services took her adoption consent when she
lacked the capacity to give it?

A.

Appellant's claims are timely. The claims accrued when she
discovered the legal cause of her injury.
The limitation period applicable to a cause of action begins

to run when the cause of action accrues. Merkley v. Beaslin, 778
P.2d 16, 18 (Utah App. 1989);

Utah Code Ann. §78-12-1.

Appellant's causes of action accrued when she discovered the
facts underlying her causes of action. Her causes of action
accrued when she discovered Social Services took her ostensible
consent while she lacked the capacity to give it.
Appellant proposed the discovery rule and the District Court
tacitly ruled it did not apply.

The mere language of the

District Court's ruling reveals its error in determining whether
to apply the discovery rule.

The court ordered "Plaintiff knew

of her injury, the loss of her child, upon leaving the hospital
in 1967, and her cause of action accrued at that time."
on Appeal, pg. 370.

Record

But the District Court failed to distinguish

between appellant's physical injury, the loss of her son, and
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appellant's legal injury, Social Services' taking of appellant's
consent when she lacked the capacity to give it.

Until 1990,

when by coincidence appellant discovered the medical records she
though had been destroyed, appellant did not and reasonably could
not know of the facts underlying her causes of action.

She did

not and reasonably could not know the circumstances under which
Social Services derived her flawed consent,
"Before a period of limitation may be tolled under either
the fraudulent concealment or exceptional circumstances versions
of the discovery rule, an initial showing must be made that the
plaintiff did not know and could not reasonably have discovered
the facts underlying the cause of action in time to commence an
action within that period."
(Utah 1996) citing

Berenda v. Langford. 914 P.2d 45, 55

Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d

1229, 1231 (Utah 1995) .x To determine when a plaintiff
reasonably could discover the facts underlying a cause of action,
the Court must distinguish between the plaintiff's physical
injury and legal injury.

The Court must determine when the

plaintiff discovered the misconduct which caused the physical
injury.

In Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 147-48 (Utah 1979),

the Utah Supreme Court stated:

1

Although the discovery rule applies judicially here, cases
in which the discovery rule applies statutorily apply similar logic
and are guiding. Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45 at fn. 2 (Utah
1996).
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We see no basis for making a legal distinction
between having no knowledge of an injury, as was the
case in Christiansen, and no knowledge that a known
injury was caused by unknown negligence.
Id. at 148, referring

to Christiansen v. Rees, 436 P.2d 435 (Utah

1968) .
The Foil court interpreted the word injury in the Health
Care Malpractice Act not to mean physical injury but to mean the
negligence which caused the physical injury, so that the statute
does not begin to run until the plaintiff discovers the legal
cause of her injury.

See also Araaon v. Clover Club Foods

Company, 857 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah App. 1993)(products liability).
The Utah Supreme Court has applied the same logic to general
statutes of limitation without statutory discovery provisions.
Merkley, 778 P.2d 16, 18.
In Merkley. a case of legal malpractice, the court noted
that although a.plaintiff may know she has been injured,
knowledge of that injury does not begin the limitation period.
Rather, the determining factor is "whether the injured party was
aware, or should have been aware, that the damage or injury
alleged was related to a specific legal transaction or
undertaking previously rendered to him or her," i.e., whether the
injured party was aware of the misconduct which caused her
injury.

Merkley. 778 P.2d at 19.

Here, plaintiff was not and

reasonably could not have been aware that her damage or injury
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was related to appellees' misconduct in time to commence an
action within the limitation period.
On January 14, 1967, plaintiff gave birth to a healthy son.
Two days later, Social Services obtained her ostensible consent
and took appellant's son to place for adoption.

Not a day since

has passed that plaintiff fails to grieve for that loss.
Appellees claim that appellant's knowledge she had lost her son
equals knowledge of her injury and thus knowledge of her claims.
But although appellant obviously was aware she had lost her son,
she was completely unaware of the circumstances under which
Social Services derived her flawed consent;

she was completely

unaware of the facts underlying her causes of action.
Appellant had no suspicion of wrongdoing to put her on
notice of her claims. Appellant loves and trusts the Church and
its offices. Appellant's Aff. 1l2. Her confidence in the Church
and its offices defeated all suspicion that Social Services had
acted wrongly in the transaction.

Appellant's Aff. 1l2. Until

she obtained her records totally by coincidence, she would not
have dreamed Social Services would have availed itself of her
incapacity*
Nonetheless, appellant's failure to discover her claims
sooner was not from a lack of diligence.

She inquired of Social

Services through its various agents over thirty times regarding
the adoption and her consent.

Social Services repeatedly told
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her it could give her no information regarding the adoption or
her son.
The District Court found she could have obtained her medical
records and thus had constructive notice of her claims.
on Appeal, pg. 390.

Record

But appellant reasonably believed her

records had been destroyed.

Appellant desired to be responsible

for the costs of her own and her son's care so on or about July
7, 1969, she asked the hospital to provide her with her records
so she could pay for the costs she had incurred.
Aff. i|l3, Record on Appeal pg. 289.

Appellant's

The hospital responded as

follows:
Since the records of our no information
maternity patients are destroyed, I can only
send you an estimated amount.
Appellant's Aff. fl4, Record on Appeal pg. 289.
From the Hospital's reply, appellant reasonably assumed her
records had been destroyed and she could have no access to them.
Appellant's Aff. tl5, Record on Appeal pg. 289.

Over 23 years

after the birth of her son, appellant and her son were reunited.
Appellant's Aff. ^16, Record on Appeal pg. 289.

Appellant

desired to obtain her son's medical records and requested them
from the Hospital on or about May 29, 1990. Appellant's Aff. 1l7,
Record on Appeal pg. 289.

In response to appellant's request, on

or about May 29, 1990, the Hospital gave her copies not of her
son's records as she had requested but of her own records, which
she reasonably had assumed were destroyed.
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Appellant's Aff. 1l8,

Record on Appeal pg. 289. Appellant then learned for the first
time she had been drugged with Thorazine during her entire
Hospital stay.

Appellant's Aff. 1l9, Record on Appeal pg. 290.

Social Services never had given appellant a copy of the
release.

After she obtained her medical records, in or about

August, 1990, appellant visited Social Services to determine what
documentation, if any, Social Services had of the authority it
claimed in placing appellant's son for adoption.

Appellant then

obtained from Social Services a copy of the release.
Aff. f20, Record on Appeal pg. 290-

Plaintiff's

By matching the release with

her hospital records, appellant discovered for the first time
Social Services had obtained her ostensible consent while
appellant was incapacitated from the effects of the drug
Thorazine.

Appellant later learned that Social Services was

aware of appellant's sedation and affected condition when it
obtained her consent.
pg. 290;

Plaintiff's Aff. f20, Record on Appeal,

Carling Aff. 1f6 & 9, Record on Appeal, pg. 308.

Once plaintiff was aware of her claim she pursued it through
every level of Church judiciary.

Plaintiff's Aff. ^22, Record on

Appeal, pg. 290. She issued volumes of correspondence.
Plaintiff's Aff. 123, Record on Appeal, pp. 290-91.

She sought

audience with Church authority at every available level,
including her Bishop, her Stake President, her Regional
Representative, the Area President and, finally, the Presiding
Bishop.

Plaintiff's Aff. 124, Record on Appeal, pg. 291.
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Appellant pleaded her case endless times in countless forums.
Then painfully, reluctantly, appellant last resorted to this
lawsuit, having exhausted all other remedies.

Plaintiff's Aff.

1(25, Record on Appeal, pg. 291. Appellant never dreamed she would
have to sue the Church she Loves and trusts.

She never dreamed

the civil courts would provide the only patient and fair minded
forum to hear her claims.

Finally, after more than two years of

asserting her rights constantly and relentlessly, she found her
neutral arbiter in this Court.

To say appellant delayed

asserting her claim is false and unfair.
Because appellant was unaware of and reasonably could not
have discovered the facts underlying her causes of action, the
discovery rule applies to toll the applicable statutes of
limitation.
where:

That rule applies in three alternative contexts

1) the legislature has adopted the rule by statute;

2)

application of the general statute of limitation rule would be
irrational or unjust; and 3) there is proof of concealment or
misleading by the defendant.
872 (Utah 1990).

Klinger v. Rightly, 791 P.2d 868,

Here: 1) it would be irrational or unjust to

consider appellant's causes of action to have accrued at the time
she lost her son;

and 2) the limitation period is tolled by the

defendants' concealment.
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1.

Rational and just application of the statutes.

To determine whether it is rational and just to bar the
claim, the Court balances

"the hardship the statute of

limitations would impose on the appellant in the circumstances of
the case outweighed any prejudice to the defendant from
difficulties of proof caused by the passage of time."
791 P.2d at 872 citing Myers, 635 P.2d at 87.

Klinaer.

Here, considering

plaintiff's cause of action to have accrued when Social Services
took her child, instead of when she discovered their misconduct,
is irrational and unjust and will work an ultimate hardship on
her.

In contrast, it will cause no prejudice to appellees.
To consider appellant's actions to have accrued when she

executed the release will impose on appellant complete hardship;
it will dispose of her claims before they accrued.
no knowledge or notice of defendants' misconduct.
no longer had her son.

She knew of her grief.

bewilderment and despair.

Appellant had
She knew she

She knew of her

Defendants blithely claim that if

appellant was so put upon she should have asserted herself to
undo the deal.

What falsehood!

All appellant's sorrow and

confusion would not persuade Social Services to let appellant
void the contract.

Carling Aff. Ull, Record on Appeal, pg. 309.

She had no claim to bring until she learned she had given her
consent while incapacitated.
In contrast, to consider appellant's claims to have accrued
when appellant became aware of appellee's misconduct will cause
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defendants no prejudice.

Appellees' arguments of prejudice are

unsupported by and contrary to the uncontroverted facts.

In

Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1987) the court
rejected defendant's claim of prejudice because he showed no
facts to support his argument that the delay between the subject
events and plaintiff's claim made him unable to contact witnesses
and gather documents.

Borland, 733 P.2d at 147.

Here, as in

Borland, appellees offer just bare, unsupported arguments of
prejudice unsupported by the record.
Appellant and Mrs. Carling are the only witnesses to
appellant's execution of the release.

Mrs. Carling recalls the

transaction and surrounding events remarkably clearly. Mrs.
Carling made a contemporaneous record of the events. All
relevant documents are intact;

none have been lost or destroyed.

A defendant cannot establish he was prejudiced by having to
defend against a stale claim where his problems of proof
occasioned by the delay are no greater than the plaintiff's.
Myers v. McDonald. 635 P.2d 84, 87 (Utah 1981);
Servicing. Inc.,

Mauahn v. SW

758 F.2d 1381, 1387-8 (10th Cir. 1985).

The

present lawsuit is preserved well and can be presented well.

To

allow it will give appellant her rightful day in court and will
do defendants no injustice.
Appellant's cause of action accrued and the limitation
period began to run when appellant first was able to discover the
legal cause of her injury.

The date of her physical injury is
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irrelevant.

Appellant's action accrued in August, 1990, and she

filed timely in May, 1993.

2.

Appellees' concealment.

Limitation periods are tolled while a defendant conceals a
claim.

Berenda v. Lanaford, 914 P.2d 45 (Utah 1996).

The rule

applies on appellant's prima facie showing of fraudulent
concealment and demonstration that given the defendant's actions
a reasonable plaintiff would not have discovered her claim
earlier.

Berenda, 914 P.2d at 53.

"The application of this

legal rule to any particular set of facts is necessarily a matter
left to trial courts and finders of fact."
Here, Gladys S. Carling, the Social Services employee who
took appellant's consent, was aware appellant was sedated and
affected when she obtained appellant's release.

Carling Aff. 16-

9, Record on Appeal, pg. 308. Mrs. Carling officially recorded
her perception that appellant was sedated and affected so Social
Services shared Mrs. Carling's awareness.

Carling Aff. 1(8-9,

Record on Appeal, pg- 308. Mrs. Carling also acted as the only
witness to~the transaction and as notary.
Record on Appeal, pg. 306.

Carling Aff. Hi,

Social Services maintained to itself

sole control of the transaction and of all information
surrounding the transaction. Appellant had no memory of executing
the release.
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After the adoption, appellant diligently inquired of Social
Services regarding the adoption and her son.
1|26, Record on Appeal, pg. 291.

Plaintiff's Aff.

For example, four days after the

birth, appellant and her mother visited Social Services to
inquire about appellant's son and the adoption.
failed to inform appellant of her incapacity.

Social Services
Plaintiff's Aff.

1(27, Record on Appeal, pg. 291. Appellant inquired of Social
Services through its various agents approximately thirty more
times.

Plaintiff's Aff. 128, Record on Appeal, pg. 291.

Although aware of appellant's flawed consent, Social Services
told appellant they could give her no other information regarding
the adoption or her son.

Social Services would not give

appellant a copy of the release until August, 1990, after
appellant confronted Social Services with the medical records
which revealed her incapacity.

Plaintiff's Aff. 120, Record on

Appeal, pg. 290.
By shunning appellant's inquiry, defendants falsely
represented to appellant that the release was legally sound or
that defendants lacked any knowledge of its unsoundness.
Appellant relied on appellees' representations and concealment
and failed to discover her claims earlier.

Because of appellees'

concealment appellant lost the support, love and companionship of
her first born son.

The damage caused by defendants' concealment

would be complete if defendants now can plead statutes of
limitation as a bar to appellant's right to redress her injuries.
37

But they cannot. Defendants' concealment tolls those statutes of
limitation and allows appellant's claims.
The Utah Supreme Court accepted appellant's position on
nearly identical facts.
P.2d 1181 (Utah 1989).

Chapman v. Primary Children's Hosp, 784
In Chapman. an infant child suffered

personal injury from a physician's malpractice.

Id. at 1183.

The child's parents confronted the physician but the physician
told them he had tested the child and determined the injury was
not caused by wrongdoing.

In truth, the physician had conducted

no tests to determine the cause of the child's injuries.

Id.

The parents' trust and confidence in the physician negated their
suspicion.

Id.

Nine years after the child's injury the parents

obtained the child's medical records and discovered for the first
time the injury was caused by the physician's misconduct.
Although the parents knew of the child's physical injury in 1973,
they were not aware of the legal injury until 1984 when they
finally obtained the child's medical records.

Id.

The statute

of limitation began to run in 1984 when the parents discovered
the legal cause of the child's injury.
1184-85.

Chapman, 784 P.2d at

Here, as in Chapman, appellant's claims did not accrue

until she was free of defendants' concealment and aware of her
injury's legal cause.
Given the appellees' actions appellant acted reasonably and
could not have discovered her claim earlier.
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See Berenda. 914

P.2d at 53.

Appellant inquired diligently of Social Services.

She reasonably believed her medical records had been destroyed.
But there is more.

Appellant placed trust and confidence in

Social Services as an office of the Church and Social Services
had extraordinary influence over her.

Plaintiff's Aff. fl2,

Record on Appeal, pg. 2 89. Where one party has extraordinary
influence in a transaction, it is presumed that the undue
influence lingers "if the causative elements giving rise to the
initial undue influence are such that the undue influence was
likely to have continued."

Robertson v. Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226,

1232 (Utah 1983)(undue influence in claimed ratification of a
contract).
For example, in Ferguson v. Jeanes. a religious leader
persuaded a devotee to give him money to form a partnership with
him.

Ferguson v. Jeanes, 619 P.2d 369, 374 (Wash. Ct. App.

1980)(ratification).

The leader failed to pay the devotee as

agreed but continually reassured the devotee the payments would
be forthcoming.

The devotee trusted the leader's assurances so

she delayed to investigate her possible legal rights against the
leader.
The court found the devotee's agreement was caused by the
leader's undue influence achieved in the name of the religion.
The same trust and confidence which caused the devotee first to
enter the contract also caused her delay in pursuing her legal
rights.

Ferguson, 619 P.2d at 374.
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Here, appellant had trust and confidence in Social Services
as an agent of the Church to which she was and remains devoted.
Plaintiff's Aff. fl2, Record on Appeal, pg. 289. Although she
was hurt and confused, her faith in the Church removed any
suspicion of wrongdoing.

It never would have occurred to her

that her Church would avail itself of her incapacity.

Social

Services' extraordinary influence overcame the instinct she
otherwise would have had to inquire into any wrongdoing.
influence never waned.

That

Appellants had a duty to disclose to

appellant material facts regarding the transaction or facts
exclusively in defendants' control.

But in spite of ample

opportunity, defendants' concealed from defendant that the
release was flawed.

She did not and could not know of her claims

until fate gave her the knowledge Social Services would not.
Against the background of appellees' concealment, appellant
reasonably could not have discovered her claims any sooner.
Appellant's cause of action accrued and the limitation period
began to run when appellant first was able to discover the legal
cause of her injury.

Appellant's action accrued in August, 1990,

and she filed timely in May, 1993.

B.

The District Court granted summary judgment although there
are material facts in dispute.
A motion for summary judgment is in effect a
demurrer to the claims of the plaintiff, saying:
assuming they are true, no right to recover is shown.
It is regarded as a harsh measure which the courts are
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reluctant to sanction because it deprives the adverse
party of an opportunity to present the evidence
concerning her grievance for adjudication. For this
reason, plaintiff's contentions must be considered in
the light most to her advantage and all doubts resolved
in favor of permitting her to go to trial; and only if
when the whole matter is so viewed, she could
nevertheless, establish no right to recovery, should
the motion be granted.
Samms v. Eccles. 358 P.2d 344, 345 (Utah 1961).
calls are for juries, not judges, to make."
45, 54 (Utah 1996) citing

"Such close

Berenda, 914 P.2d

Chapman v. Primary Children's Hospital,

784 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1989).
The District Court's granted summary judgment in the face of
numerous core issues which properly are questions of fact for the
jury and as to each of which appellant offered substantial
evidence to place the issue in dispute, as follows:
1.

When appellant knew or with reasonable diligence should

have known of the facts underlying her causes of action so to
commence running of the statute of limitations.
Berenda v. Langford. 914 P.2d 45, 54 (Utah 1996);

See, e.g..
Mauahan v. SW

Servicing. Inc., 758 F.2d 1381, 1387-88 (1985). Appellant's Aff.
11 3, 7, 8, 13-15 & 20. Record on Appeal, pp. 287-90;

Carling

Aff. 11 A-10, Record on Appeal, pp. 306-08.
2.

The point at which appellant reasonably should have

known that she had suffered a legal injury so to commence running
of the limitation period.

See, e.g.. Merkley v. Beaslin. 778

P.2d 16, 18 (Utah )(interpreting Utah Code Ann. 78-27-14)(lawyer
malpractice); Andreini v. Hultgren. 860 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah
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1993)(medical malpractice);

Lawhon v, L.B.J. Institutional

SupplY, 765 P.2d 1003, 1007 (Ariz. App. 1988).

Appellant's Aff.

11 3, 7, 8, 13-15 Sc 20, Record on Appeal, pp. 287-90.
3.

The reasonableness of appellant's efforts to discover

her legal injury.

See, e.g., Araann v. Clover Club Foods, 857

P.2d 250, 253 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Record on Appeal, pp. 289-292;

Appellant's Aff. 11 12-28,

Carling Aff. 11 1 & 4-9, Record

on Appeal, pp. 306-08.
4.

Whether appellees' concealment of her claims tolled

statutes of limitations.

See, e.g.. Berenda v. Laugford, 914

P.2d 45, 54 (Utah 1996)("application of this legal rule to any
particular set of facts is necessarily a matter left to trial
courts and finders of fact").
Appeal, pp. 306-08;

Carling Aff. 1 & 7-9, Record on

Appellant's Aff. 3, 8 & 12-28, Record on

Appeal, pp. 287-292.
5.

The existence of a confidential relationship.

VonHake v. Thomas. 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985).

See

Appellant's

Aff. 11 3 & 12, Record on Appeal, pg. 287-89.
The District Court improperly denied appellant her day in
court to resolve those factual issues. Paragraphs 2 through 7 of
the District Court's summary judgment order must be reversed.
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C.

The summary judgment order erroneously relies on
evidence of issues not properly before the court.
Issues of appellant's contractual capacity and of the

release's validity or invalidity were not before the District
Court.

The issues were not raised in appellee's motion for

summary judgment or any other motion.

Nonetheless, appellees

began to offer evidence of appellant's capacity as follows:
MR. NELSON: ... Now, an important point on that
release -- the issue here on the underlying merits is,
of course, whether the relinquishment was voluntary and
whether she had capacity, she did know what she was
doing. In fact, she wrote:
In the event of the adoptive parents
being unable to care, protect or otherwise
perform all the other responsibilities, I
desire the agency to place the child back in
my custody.
And she wrote that, and she signed it. And so it
is pretty clear -THE COURT:
MR. NELSON:

What do have that's her handwriting?
No denial ...

In apparent anticipation of appellant's objection,
appellees' counsel then explained to the District Court that
appellant's contractual capacity was not properly before the
court, as follows:
MR. NELSON: ... We need not resolve today --it
is not a material fact -- whether plaintiff was, in
fact, incapacitated. All of our defenses make that
immaterial, that question immaterial.
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Record on Appeal, pg. 386. Nonetheless, the District Court
apparently based its ruling on that issue.

The District Court

stated:
THE COURT: ... That Amended Complaint sets forth
four causes of action: Negligence, constructive fraud,
intentional infliction of emotional distress and breach
of contract. I suppose there were --if you get in the
contract area -- and that's principally the reason I've
vacated my earlier ruling and wanted to look again at
the validity or invalidity of the consent.
Record on Appeal, pg. 390. The validity or invalidity of
appellant's consent was not properly before the District Court
and cannot be the basis for its ruling.
The issue of appellant's capacity and the release's validity
are questions of fact for the jury.

When that issue is properly

considered, appellant will offer fact witness testimony, expert
witness testimony, and documentary and other evidence so the
District Court will be properly informed.
The evidence which appellees improperly submitted and then
withdrew on which the District Court apparently relied reveals
the issue is disputed and could not be resolved on summary
j udgment.
Appellees offered as evidence of appellant's capacity the
release and a handwritten addendum to the release.

But to the

contrary, the release and its addendum reveals appellant's
incapacity.

The addendum states as follows:

In the event of the adoptive parents being unable
to care, protect or otherwise perform all the other
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responsibilities, I desire the agency to place the
child back in my custody.
Record on Appeal, pg. 295-96.
The record reveals appellant was a 23 year old graduate
student at the relevant time.

It is reasonable to infer she was

well educated and articulate.

But the addendum is incoherently

written.

It is grammatically incorrect.

Although one may infer

several meanings from a generous reading of it, taken literally
it is nonsense.

Also, the addendum speaks impersonally of "the

child", not of "my son" or "my child" as a newborn's mother would
speak.
Strangely, the release would allow for a single parent to
adopt appellant's child although the Church's counsel to
appellant was that she would ruin her child's life if she raised
it alone.

Record on Appeal, pg. 295.

In her right mind,

appellant would not have executed a release which allowed another
what it deprived of her.

Finally, appellant was drugged so

heavily she has no memory of executing the release.
From those facts of record, it is not reasonable to infer
appellant had adequate capacity to enter the release and
relinquish her child for adoption.

At the very least, the matter

of appellant's capacity remains in dispute as a question of fact
for the District Court to consider on proper proof.

Based on the

inappropriate finding that appellant had contractual capacity,
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paragraphs 2 through 7 of the summary judgment order are flawed
and cannot endure.

II.

THE ORDER DISALLOWING THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT.
Appellant moved for permission to file a second amended

complaint to substitute certain doe defendants' true names as
learned in discovery, to present a more clear statement of
plaintiff's case and to provide appellees better notice of
appellant's claims to allow appellees to respond better.
Appellant's amended complaint and proposed second amended
complaint are included in the appendix to this brief.
Inexplicably, the District Court disallowed the amendment as
follows:
Based on [the District Court's February 20, 1996,
minute entry ruling!, the Court now hereby orders that
plaintiff's motion is denied for the reasons that the
proposed amendment (1) alleges no actionable misconduct
by the additional parties; (2) identifies no specific
policies to be at issue; and (3) adds nothing of
substance to the case.
Record on Appeal, pp. 244-45.

A.

Amendments should be allowed liberally.
To properly frame the issues, to allow the parties a fair

opportunity to present their claims, and to assure that trials
conform to and include all relevant facts and applicable law,
courts liberally should allow the parties to amend their
pleadings.
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... [A] party may amend his pleading only by
leave of Court or by written consent of the
adverse party; and leave shall be freely
given when justice so requires.
Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a).
The rule in this State has always been to allow
amendments freely where justice requires, and
especially this is true before trial.
Gillman v. Hansen, 486 P.2d 1045, 1046 (Utah 1971).

B.

The amendment should be allowed to substitute certain doe
defendants' names as learned in discovery.
After plaintiff filed an amended complaint, counsel engaged

in several rounds of very efficient, cooperative informal
discovery in which defendants' counsel schooled plaintiff's
counsel in the defendants' true roles and relationships.
Plaintiff fashioned her second amended complaint based on the
information defendants provided regarding those parties
identities.

Based on that information she substituted certain

doe defendants' true names. Record on Appeal, pg. 182-94 & 15860.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 9(a)(2) allows:
(2) Designation of unknown defendant. When a
party does not know the name of an adverse party, he
may state that fact in the pleadings, and thereupon
such adverse party may be designated in any pleading or
proceeding by any name; provided, that when the true
name of such adverse party is ascertained, the pleading
or proceeding must be amended accordingly.
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When appellant learned the doe defendants' true names, Rule
9(a)(2) mandated she amend her complaint to name them.

The

District Court erred in disallowing that mandatory amendment.
C.

The amendment would not prejudice the appellees.
A prime consideration in determining whether an
amendment should be permitted is the adequacy of and
opportunity for the opposing party to meet the newly
raised matter.

Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94, 98 (Utah 1981).
Here, the amendment's factual matter was based on
information defendants provided in discovery so they must already
have notice of it.

The amendment added no new causes of action.

The appellees cannot complain they would have an inadequate
opportunity "to meet the newly raised matter," factual or legal.
Although the present matter had aged chronologically at the
time of appellant's motion, it had not matured to match its age.
With or without the second amendment the case was at its
procedural inception.

There has been no formal discovery and

minimal trial preparation.

The only advance beyond appellant's

amended complaint was appellees' answer, which appellees could
have conformed to the second amended complaint without
substantial expense.

The appellees cannot complain to be

prejudiced by a substitute complaint when the case is still at
the pleading stage.
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The District Court should have allowed the amendment.

It's

order denying appellant permission to amend is in error and
should be reversed.

VII.

CONCLUSION.

For all these years, defendants have relied on an adoption
release which Social Services itself believed to be flawed.

How

surprised can the appellees be that when the truth they had
suppressed finally came out they were made to answer for their
wrongdoing?
Appellant's cause of action accrued and the limitation
period began to run when appellant first was able to discover the
legal cause of her injury.

The date of her physical injury is

irrelevant. Against the background of appellees' concealment,
appellant reasonably could not have discovered her claims any
sooner.

Appellant's action accrued in August, 1990, and she

filed timely in May, 1993.
The District Court improperly denied appellant her day in
court to resolve factual issues necessary to a proper ruling.
It's improper determination of those fact issues included
inappropriate findings on issues not properly before the District
Court. Paragraphs 2 through 7 of the District Court's summary
judgment order must be reversed.
The District Court also disallowed a second amended
complaint to substitute certain doe defendants' true names as
49

learned in discovery, to present a more clear statement of
plaintiff's case and to provide appellees better notice of
appellant's claims to allow appellees to respond better.
District Court should have allowed the amendment.

The

The District

Court's order denying appellant permission to amend is in error
and should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted on December 5, 1996

RicMrd G. Hackwell
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SERVICE CERTIFICATE
I certify that on December 5, 1996, two correct copies of
the appellant's brief were served by mail to the following:
David M. McConkie, Esq.
Thomas D. Walk, Esq.
Kirton & McConkie
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411
Dated December 5, 1996.
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ADDENDUM
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-25(3)
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-23(2)
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER
TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING OF APPELLEES' SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT ORDER
AMENDED COMPLAINT
PROPOSED SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
FEB 20, 1996 MINUTE ENTRY RULING DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
PERMISSION TO FILE HER SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS

78-12-25

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions
§ 33 et seq.

Key Numbers. - Limitation of Actions <$=
58(2).

78-12-25. Within four years.
An action may be brought within four years:
(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument in writing; also on an open account for goods, wares, and merchandise, and for any article charged on a store account; also on an open
account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished;
provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at
any time within four years after the last charge is made or the last
payment is received;
(2) for a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections
of Title 25, Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act:
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), which in specific situations limits the
time for action to one year, under Section 25-6-10;
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1);
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-25; L. 1988, ch. 59, § 14; 1996,
ch. 79, § 110.
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996, in the introductory paragraph, substituted "An action may be
brought within" for "Within"; deleted "An ac-

tion" at the beginning of Subsections (1) and (3);
and made stylistic changes.
Cross-References. — Antitrust Act actions,
§ 76-10-925.
Product Liability Act, statute of limitations,
§ 78-15-3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Assigned cause of action.
Breach of fiduciary duty.
Conflict of laws.
Damage of private property for public use.
Discovery rule.
Discovery rule.
Divorce actions.
Equitable actions.
Excessive freight charges.
Extension of period.
Federal civil rights actions.
Indemnity or guaranty bond.
Judgment lien.
Land contract.
Malpractice.
Mortgages.
Negligent employment.
Nuisances.
Open account.
Oral contract.
Oral modification of written contract.

Other claims for relief.
— Federal claim.
— Negligence.
— Promissory estoppel.
Paternity action.
Overpayment.
Personal injuries.
Pleading and proof.
Product liability.
Purpose of section.
Quieting title.
Recovery of payments under note.
Reformation of instrument.
Relation back of complaints.
Relief not otherwise provided for.
Restraining actions.
Running of statute.
— Payment of settlement obligation.
Stockholder's duty to pay taxes.
Taking for public use.
Tax paid under protest.
Tolling.
— Class actions.
Torts.
Trustees.
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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
violate the automatic stay provisions of the
federal bankruptcy code, because a renewal is
not an attempt to enforce, collect, or expand the
original judgment. Barber v. Emporium Partnership, 800 P.2d 795 (Utah 1990).
Stipulations.
Parties to contract may stipulate for period of
limitations shorter than that fixed by statute of
limitations. Clark v. Lund, 55 Utah 284, 184 P.
821 (1919).
Support or maintenance.
The eight-year statute of limitations applies
to past due unpaid installments for alimony or
support of minor children, and therefore execution may issue only for the arrearages accumulated within a period of eight years. Seeley v.
Park, 532 P2d 684 (Utah 1975).
A Utah action brought in 1978 to enforce a
1975 Ohio action for support arrearages, which
also included a 1967 Ohio action for support
arrearages, was timely filed under this section.
Logan v. Schneider, 609 P.2d 943 (Utah 1980).
Wife could apply her time-barred claim for
child support arrearages to offset her husband's
Hen on the marital home, and then affirma-

78-12-23

tively assert her claim for past due support that
had accrued within the limitations period.
Coulon v. Coulon, 915 P.2d 1069 (Utah Ct. App.
1996).
Tolling.
In action by administrator, indebtedness created by check was held to be barred, and
statute was not tolled by unauthorized acts of
plaintiff. Bingham v. Walker Bros., Bankers, 75
Utah 149, 283 P. 1055 (1929).
Action to renew a judgment brought more
than eight years after the date of entry of the
original judgment was barred by this section
even though defendant had signed a written
agreement acknowledging the obligation and
had made some payments thereon less than
eight years before commencement of the action.
The common-law rule which tolled the limitation period in case of acknowledgment or part
payment is limited by § 78-12-44 so that it now
applies only to contract actions. Yergensen v.
Ford, 16 Utah 2d 397, 402 P.2d 696 (1965).
Cited in Van Tassell v. Shaffer, 742 P.2d 111
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and
Separation §§ 1073,1074; 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 897 et seq.
C.J.S. - 27C C.J.S Divorce §§ 684 to 693; 50
C.J.S. Judgments §§ 854, 871; 67AC.J.S. Parent and Child §§ 73 to 89.
A.L.R. — Statute of limitations: effect of

delay in appointing administrator or other representative on cause of action accruing at or
after death of person in whose favor it would
have accrued, 28 A.L.R.3d 1141.
Key Numbers. — Divorce «» 311; Judgment
s=> 910, 934; Parent and Child <®=> 3.3(4), 3.4(2).

78-12-23. Within six years — Mesne profits of real property - Instrument in writing.
An action may be brought within six years:
(1) for the mesne profits of real property;
(2) upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in writing, except those mentioned in Section 78-12-22.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-23; L. 1984, ch. 16, § 2; 1996,
ch. 79, § 109; 1996, ch. 210, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amendment by ch. 79, effective April 29, 1996, in the
introductory paragraph, substituted "An action
may be brought within" for "Within"; deleted
"An action" at the beginning of Subsections (1)
to (3); and in Subsections (1) and (2), substituted a semicolon for a period.
The 1996 amendment by ch. 210, effective

April 29, 1996, deleted former Subsection (3)
regarding distribution of criminal proceeds to
victims.
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and Greneral
Counsel.
Cross-References. — Product Liability Act,
statute of limitations, § 78-15-3.
Promise to pay extends period, § 78-12-44.
Three-year limitation period for action on
written insurance contract, § 31A-21-313.
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David M. McConkie (A2154)
Merrill F. Nelson (A3841)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Defendants
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1104
Telephone: (801) 328-3600

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
NANCY G. SAFSTEN,

ORDER

Plaintiff,
Case No. 930902822PI

vs.
LDS SOCIAL SERVICES, INC., a Utah
corporation; THE CORPORATION OF
THE PRESIDING BISHOP OF THE
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF
LATTER-DAY SAINTS, a Utah
corporation, and DOES 1-10,

Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

Defendants.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and separate Motion for Protective Order,
Sanctions, and to Quash Subpoena came on for hearing before the Honorable Judge Kenneth
Rigtrup on May 13, 1996. Defendants were represented by Merrill F. Nelson and David M.
McConkie; plaintiff was represented by Richard G. Hackweil. The Court, having considered the
written memoranda and oral arguments of the parties, now hereby enters the following order:

O C . A ; ^

1. The statute of limitations and statute of repose in the Health Care Malpractice Act,
U.C.A. § 78-14-4(1), do not apply because the taking of plaintiffs adoption consent does not
constitute provision of medical care to the plaintiff.
2. Plaintiffs tort claims are barred by the statute of limitations in U.CA. § 78-1225(3), and plaintiffs contract claim is barred by the statute of limitations in U.CA. § 78-12-23(2).
3. Plaintiff knew of her injury, the loss of her child, upon leaving the hospital in 1967,
and her cause of action accrued at that time.
4. The administration of thorazinc was reasonably discoverable by plaintiff within the
limitations period following her release from the hospital, but plaintiff failed to take reasonable
steps to discover the cause of her alleged incapacity.
5. Plaintiff was on notice to inquire about the circumstances surrounding the taking
of her consent because, as she alleged, "not a day has passed since January, 1967, that plaintiff
has not felt the deep heartache and void of the loss of her child and the loss of the joys of
motherhood."
6. Plaintiffs action is time-barred under any applicable statute of limitations, and her
Amended Complaint is accordingly dismissed with prejudice.
7. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
8. With the granting of the Motion for Summary Judgment, defendants' separate
Motion for Protective Order, Sanctions, and to Quash Subpoena is rendered moot.

-2-

:

O0!>&»

DATED this J3_ day o M « * , 1996.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

^M^v of June,
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed the foregoing ORDER this-f^'day
1996, in the United States mail, postage prepaid to the following:
Richard G. Hackwell
Mclntyre Building, 8th Floor
68 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1534
Attorney for Plaintiff
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ORIGINAL

NANCY J. SAFSTEN,
Plaintiff,
-vs-

Case No. 930902822

L O.S. SOCIAL SERVICES,
ET AL.,

HEARING, 5-13-96

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 13th day
of May, 1996, at 9:00 o'clock a.m., this cause came
on for hearing before the HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP,
District Court, without a jury in the Salt Lake
County Courthouse, Salt Lake City, Utah.
A P P E A R A N C E S :

CAT by:

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

For the Plaintiff:

RICHARD G. HACKWELL
Attorney at Law

For the Defendant:

MERRILL F. NELSON
Attorney at Law

CARLTON S. WAY, CSR, RPR

PROCEEDINGS
THE COURT: Nancy J. Safsten versus
St. Benedict's Hospital, et al., 930902822.
May we have your appearances for the
record, please?
MR. NELSON: Merrill Nelson and David
McConkie here for the Defendants.
MR. HACKWELL: Richard Hackwell for
Plaintiff Nancy Safsten.
THE COURT: You may proceed.
MR. NELSON: Your Honor, we have two
separate motions before you. I don't know the order
the Court prefers. What I plan to do is go through
the motion for summary judgement first.

Page 2

THE COURT: Thar S fine.

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

MR. NELSON: And then we can fall back on
the other motion as necessary.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. NELSON: Your Honor, this is a
summary judgement motion. And the basis for it, of
course, is that there are no material issues of fact
and all of the Defendants are entitled to judgements
as a matter of law.
The Plaintiff, inrespondingto our
motion for summary judgement, failed to specifically

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
u
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

controvert any of our alleged facts; therefore, they
are deemed admitted for purposes of this motion.
Just briefly, those facts are that
approximately 30 years ago in 1967 the Plaintiff was
a single woman of about 21 years. She approached-she contacted L.D.S. Social Services for assistance
in placing her child for adoption. And the agency
provided several weeks of counseling. She decided to
place her child for adoption. She went into the
hospital, delivered the child during that process—
or following the birth, she was administered pain
killer, some kind of medication for the pain. And
two days after the birth, our agent, Mrs. Carlene
(phonetic), went to the hospital andreceivedthe
Plaintiffsreleaserelinquishingthe child to L.D.S.
Social Services for placement
Now, an important point on that release
- the issue here on the underlying merits is, of
course, whether therelinquishmentwas voluntary and
whether she had capacity. The Plaintiffs own
handwritten statement on thereleaseindicates that
she was - she did have capacity, she did know what
she was doing. In fact she wrote:
"In the event ot the adoptive
parents being unable to care, protect
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1
or otherwise perform all the other
2
responsibilities, I desire the agency
3
to place the child back in my
4
custody."
5
Ana she wrote that, and she signed it.
6 And so it is pretty clear -7
THE COURT: what do we have that that's
8 her handwriting?
9
MR. NELSON: No denial. We have alleged
10 that that's her handwriting, and they haven't
11 disputed that. And so, Your Honor, the child was
12 placed for adoption. And two days after the
13 placement the Plaintiff alleges that she came with
14 her mother to the agency inquiring what happened to
15 her child, presumably asking about getting ner child
16 back. And she alleges now that there were 30 more
17 other such visits shortly after that; 30 times she
18 came and expressed her remorse, her grief, her
19 regret, stating that that's not what she wanted to
20 do, that it was against what she wanted and she
21 wanted her baby back; 30 more times she did that.
22
We need not resolve today - it is not a
23 material fact - whether the Plaintiff was, in fact,
24 incapacitated. All of our defenses make that fact
25 immaterial, that question immaterial.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
n
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

We have two categories of defenses on our
summary judgement motion, and I group them as time
defenses and then substantive defenses. Under the
first category of time defenses, we've alleged and
demonstrated that the medical malpractice statute of
limitations applies to this case. That's a two-year
statute that runs from discovery ~
THE COURT: My ruling prior was that it
did not apply because the social worker was not
rendering health care, and that was the basis of my
conclusion before and would still be the same.
MR. NELSON: it would be the same
ruling?
THE COURT: Sure.
MR. NELSON: Very well. I won't spend
time on that then.
We'll move on to the other statutes of
limitations. The Plaintiff has not contested those
statutes. The tort claims - the three tort claims
would all be governed by the general - the four-year
catchall statute of limitations, and the contract
claim would be governed by the six-year statute for a
written contract.
All of those claims accrue and the
statutes begin to run with the existence of the claim

1 as soon as there is an injury and the Plaintiff has
2 someone to sue for that injury. All of those
3 statutes begin to run withoutregardto the
4 discovery. The Utah law makes clear that ignorance
5 of a cause of action does not toll the running of the
6 statute.
7
And so all of those statutes began to run
8 in 1967 when the Plaintiff knew of her injury, which
9 she has not disputed. Her injury was the loss of her
10 child; not disputed.
u
She also knew the cause of that injury.
12 She knew that the child had been relinquished for
13 adoption to L.D.S. Social Services. So she knew
14 where the child was, she knew who to sue and she had
15 a cause of action. She had a legal theory: Under
16 duress. If the placement truly was against her will,
17 then she had a cause of action for duress back in
18 1967. And all of her four claims would be barred
19 long before 1993 when she filed this action.
20
Now, the Plaintiff makes the argument
21 that the discovery rule should apply. And under that
22 discovery rule, tfie causes of action would not begin
23 to run, or the time would not begin to run, until the
24 Plaintiff actually discovered the cause of acticwi.
25 The problem with this defense, though, Your Honor, is
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1 the Plaintiff's continually focusing on discovery of
2 the medication, which is a red herring in the
3 nomenclature. It is a red herring because the real
4 issue is when she discovered her duress claim, and
5 the duress claim was not tolled pending discovery of
6 the incapacity claim based on the medication. And so
7 even if the discovery rule is applied under the
8 exceptional circumstances theory, she still
9 discovered her injury, the cause of her injury and
10 identified a person sne could sue back in 1967.
11
Now, of course, we've raised some other
12 defenses, basic defenses, of why the discovery rule
13 wouldn't even apply. The exceptional circumstances
14 discovery rule was not adopted oy the Utah Supreme
15 Court until 1981, and the Plaintiff's claim was
16 barred clear back in the '60s or '70's at the latest,
17 long before this discovery rule was adopted;
18 therefore, the Defendants have a vested defense that
19 cannot be divested by later adoption of the discovery
20 rule. So the discovery rule cannot apply in this
21 case.
22
The other barrier to application of the
23 discovery rule is the threshoia requirement that
24
there be ignorance of any other cause of action. By
25
_ ^ f i ^ i o n , ^ the Plaintiff knows of some cause of
1 action, then there is some discovery there, and
2 cannot olead discovery of a later tneory. And so
3 here, o f course, as we ve indicated, the Plaintiff
4 was aware in 1967 of a cause of action for duress or
5 rescission of the release based on duress that could
6 have been filed against the agency.
7
An illustrative case that we've cited in
8 the memorandum is the Pritzlaff case. It was an
9 interesting case in which a woman had a sexual
10 relationship with a priest and went through that
11 relationship for many years and discovered going
12 through counseling that that relationship was the
13 cause of some mental and emotional damage. And so
14 she filed her action, claiming "I've just discovered,
15 my counselor has just told me, that my emotional
16 condition is caused by that sexual relationship."
17 And the Court saidj 'TJO, your action is time-barred.
18 Even though you did not discover until many years
19 later the connection between your condition and the
20 relationship, you still knew back when the
121 relationship ended. You had a cause of action back
22 then for battery or whatever else,
if as you allege,
23 the contact was non-consensual.M
24
And so that is a good illustrative case.
25
The Court has referred to its prior
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ruling. This Court has also previously ruled that
based on the Plaintiffs allegations that every day
since 1967 she's felt the sorrow and pain and remorse
and regret of this decision. Based on that, this
Court ruled:
"Given thorn circumstances,
Plaintiff was OG notice to make
inquiry about the circumstances
surrounding the taking of her
consent. Sne either knew or
reasonably should have known of any
misconduct of Defendants many more
years than the three-year limitations
contained in the fraud statute.11
That's back when she had alleged fraud,
but that is dropped But the same reasoning
applies: She knew or should have known back in 1967
that she had some cause of action. Based on that.
knowledge of some cause of action, specifically the
cause of action for duress, she cannot pled ignorance
of the incapacity claim to toll the other cause of
action. So those are the statute of limitations.
Now, if we move on to laches, laches is
an equitable defense that applies without regard to
the statute of limitations. Even if those elements

PARLTON WAY. RPR. 801-535-5464
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for some reason are technically not satisfied, the
Court can still bar the action oased on fairness and
equity. It is just simply to long to wait to file a
lawsuit. Based on the fact that the Plaintiff knew
of a cause of action back in 1967, waiting until 1993
to file her action is certainly unreasonable delay in
[il'mg that action. If the Defendants were required
to defend that cause of action now after all or these
30 years, it would result in great prejudice to the
Defendants because many of the witnesses are cannot be located or have passed on or do not
remember what happened.
Now, the Plaintiff says, "Well, that's no
problem. We only have two witnesses, the Plaintiff
and the Social Service worker, Mrs. Carlene." But
that's not true. Many other witnesses would be
required to establish what she intended to do at the
time and her actions after that. And so we'd want to
contact the biological father. He's been
identified. We would want to contact her physician
who ordered the medication; the nurses in the
hospital
who were there who viewed her condition.
We v d want to contact the Plaintiffs parents, if they
are still alive. I understand one of them is not.
There are many other witnesses that would have to be
Page
located and — to see what they could remember about
the Plaintiffs condition, her mental state and what
she intended at the time. All of that, the
difficulty of that burden of proof to the Defendants,
would result in great prejudice to the Defendants;
therefore, the lacnes also bars the Plaintiff s cause
of action.
Those are the time defenses statutes of
limitations and laches. But, Your Honor, the
substantive defenses are just as convincing, just as
persuasive, even without - even if it is not
time-barred, what is the Plaintiffs injury in this
case? The only alleged injury is emotional, the
emotional pain. And we don't deny that there would
be pain from loss of a son. That is her injury. But
witn that injury, if that's her only claim - sne
hasn't alleged a personal injury, no allegation of
economic loss, only emotional injury. Utah law is
clear that under the theories she's alleged,
negligence, constructive fraud and breach of
contract, emotional distress, damages cannot be
recovered under those theories. Therefore, even if
she prevailed under those theories, what relief would
the Court grant? What relief would the Court award
to this Plaintiff? There is no relief that can be
Pag<
awarded.
The only theory that she's alleged in
which she can recover emotional distress damages is
intentional infliction of emotional distress. And an
essential element of that claim is, of course,
outrageous conduct We've demonstrated that that can
be decided as a matter of law where it is absent.
And here what was our conduct? Here, we are a
licensed child placement agency, we took the
Plaintiffs adoption consent at ner request, nothing
more. That action, by definition, is not
outrageous.
This Court is aware of the cases that
decide what is outrageous: Samms v. Eccles,
subsequent cases, most of them deal with a long
course of conduct in which the defendant intended and
pursued and harassed and stocked a plaintiff for the
purpose of causing emotional distress. There was
nothing like that here. We went to the hospital two
days after the birth, and at her request, we took her
consent At her request, we placed the baby for
adoption. That's not outrageous conduct That does
not offend the common standards of decency in the
community.
Finally, the breach of contract. Your

_

_
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1
Plaintiff simply was not on any notice to
2 discover any more than that. When she approached
3 Social Services to express to them her sorrow, the
4 response was: "We can do nothing for you." Although
5 they were in a confidential relationship, although
6 they had a duty to disclose any irregularity, they
7 being in a superior position or knowledge, their
8 response simply was: "No, we can do nothing for
9 you. We cannot give you a copy of the release. We
10 cannot do anything more for you than we already
11 have."
12
Not until Plaintiff, by coincidence,
13 discovered the legal cause or her injury did the
14 facts come together for her and did she discover for
15 the first time, "Yes, I do have a claim." Then the
16 limitation period began.
17
Defendants claim that the discovery rule
18 would only apply if the Plaintiff were ignorant of
19 any cause of action. As I've already addressed, Your
20 Honor, she had no cause of action prior to learning
21 of her incapacity. Plaintiff makes no claim for
22 duress. Plaintiff's claims are solely based on the
23 Defendants having taken her consent while she lacked
24 the contractual capacity to give that consent.
25
The cases which Defendants cite and those
Page 17
Page 14
1 order now or we can handle it separately as you
1 which Plaintiff cite, as well, state clearly that one
2 desire.
2 must be ignorant or the cause of action sued on; not
3
THE COURT: Let Mr. Hackwell respond to
3 of any available cause of action, but a cause of
4 that much.
4 action which the Plaintiff now means to avail herself
5
MR. NELSON: very well.
5 of.
6
MR. HACKWELL: Good morning, Your Honor.
6
It is a very common situation, Your
7
THE COURT: Good morning.
7 Honor, in which statute of limitations in tort may
8
MR. HACKWELL: First, let me respond very
8 have run, but the same facts could rise to a cause of
9 briefly to the issue of inquiry notice. Certainly,
9 action in contract, which still has a very v i a b l e 10 Plaintiff was aware of the loss of her son. There
10 which is still viable based upon continued
11 was no issue of that. This also has — carries over
u limitations, period And although the statute of
12 to the Defendants' statements of fact. Perhaps I
12 limitations may have rim on other causes of action,
13 should address that first.
13 that contract or other causes of action are still
14
I recognize that the statements of fact
14 viable. Even if the Defendants' arguments were
15 in Plaintiffs memorandum are a bid extraordinary.
15 correct, that would still be the situation here. If
16 That is because, Your Honor - the
flaw
is
not
16 Plaintiff has a vialable cause of action, she is
17 there. The flaw is in Defendants1 statement of facts
17 entitled to bring it.
18 in which they would have support their motions. We
18
A critical element, of course, of
19 don't contest any of those facts. Those facts are,
19 Plaintiffs claim is that the Defendants - that the
20 in truth, uncontroverted as are a number of
20 prejudice to the Defendants cannot be outweighed by
21 additional facts which we - that the Plaintiff also
21 the hardship which the application of the statute of
22 limitations would cause the Plaintiff. And as the
22 proposes in her memorandum. However, those facts
23 simply don't support the Defendants' legal
23 cases also make clear, a mere argument of prejudice,
24 arguments.
24 again, doesn't suffice as evidence of any of that
25
Once again, the Defendants have focused
25 prejudice.
Page 15
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1
The Defendants — there is no affidavit
l upon the Plaintiffs physical injury, and there was
2 that they have tried to contact any of those
2 no question that she was very aware of that. Her
3 witnesses on which they intend to rely, that they
3 constant protests exist as evidence that she was
4 have tried to contact the natural father or the
4 injured. She was very aware of i t She was in deep
5 parents and have been unable to do so. As in the
5 pain and confusion* But, as the law makes very, very
6 case of Mrs. Carlene, although the events were long
6 clear, it is not physical injury which carries the
7 day. It is not the physical injury which tolls - or
7 ago, Mrs. Carlene*s recollection was extremely
8 clear. She, is to say, will be a vehement, very
8 wtiich, rather, triggers the beginning of the running
9 vocal, witness in this case. There's simply no
9 of the statute of G5utations; limitations period.
io prejudice for having - in Mrs. Carlene's mind for
io It is the discovery of the legal injury. Here, of
11 the time-lapse that occurred
u course, the legal injury was Plaintiff s discovering
12
So, then, the Defendants' mere argument
12 that she was incapacitated while she gave that
13 that they are prejudiced won't suffice for there is
13 consent.
14 no evidence of that prejudice.
14
All of the Plaintiffs sorrow, all of her
15
In contrast, Your Honor, we are dealing
15 confusion, all of her regret would not suffice to
16 with a woman who for over 20 years sought out the
16 disaffirm this contract Be it void or voidable, the
17 cause of her injury. As her affidavit states, over
17 Plaintiff approached the Defendants a number of
18 30 times in the few - in the months following having
18 times, dozens of times* to raise to them the issue of
19 given up her child, she sought out to find out what
19 her sorrow, of her confusion and her regret. But
20
was wrong. She couldn't learn anything from the
20 they did not recognize it, and nor, Your Honor, would
21 medical records because, although having inquired,
21 a court of law. That simply does not raise to the
22 she reasonably believed those records had been
22 level of an actionable claim. If that were true,
23 destroyed.
23 every birth mother who's ever given a child up far
24
I believe the best evidence of how she
24 adoption would be able to sue based on sorrow,
25
would
have
and did pursue her claim is how she
25 contusion and regret.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
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Honor, at this point having read through the
memoranda, their response, the contract claim is in
pretty much disarray. I don't know what's left of
it. There is no breach of contract here. The only
alleged breach is her incapacity. But that does not
breach a contract. That just renders it voidable.
And we have cited similar cases, for example, where a
plaintiff was intoxicated at the time he sold an
animal, a bull. And after it was over, he tried to
get his bull back. And the Court said, "No, your
remedy was to either disaffirm or confirm the
contract after regaining your capacity. Because you
affirmed the contract, you took no action to get your
bull back, the contract is valid and enforceable.
That's the same thing here. For 30
years, Your Honor, the Plaintiff has affirmed this
contract. She's failed to file an action to get her
child back. She's instead accepted the benefits of
that contract by allowing someone else to rear her
child and incur those expenses, and so there is no
breach of contract claim. If anything, it was
voidable. She failed to disaffirm it.
Now, Your Honor, that's the argument on
the motion for summary judgment on the merits of the
case. We can proceed to the motion for protective
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decision this woman has ever made in her life were
simply removed by the drug, Thorazine.
The Primary Children's Hospital case is a
perfect parallel, I believe, Your Honor In that
case the parents, once again, knew of the - in that
case, the parents of an infant child took a child to
a hospital in Ogden to receive some treatment When
that didn't go well, the child was moved to Primary
Children's Hospital and they remedied the error One
of the physicians at Primary Children's opining about
his own conduct and the conduct of the Ogden hospital
stated flippantly in retrospect that there is -- that
she had no cause -- the parents had no legal cause of
action That the child's injuries were simply
unavoidable. Years later, seven or eight years
later, the parents discovered that that was not the
case, and that the physician had no inquiry into the
underlying records. Seven or eight years later the
parent, themselves, received the medical records.
And the case doesn't say how or why, the case doesn't
explain that delay in their receiving the medical
records. The case simply says seven or eight years
later they received a copy or the medical records,
and then learned for the first time that they had
causes of action based on serious misconduct. There,
Pag,
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1 as here, until those parents learned of that
1 this lawsuit.
2
The same facts then support Plaintiff's
2 misconduct, until those parents learned of the legal
3 defense to her - Defendants1 claims of
3 causes of the injury, the statute of limitations did
4 ratification. We believe, Your Honor, that this
4 not begin to run then. Again, by parallel here, this
5 claim — this contract is void. The release on which
5 Plaintiff couldn't have known of any grounds on which
6 Defendants rely has been void from its inception.
6 to ratify this contract.
7 Defendants' claims that Plaintiff relied on it and
7
Finally, Your Honor, as to damages, an
8 took the benefit from it, is simply specious. The
8 issue touched on in the Plaintiffs brief out not
9 fact that she allowed these parents to raise her
9 thoroughly disclosed is what to do when a void or
10 claim -- or to raise her child, the loss of which was
10 voidable contract is such that the parties cannot be
11 so painful to her, is just specious beyond one's
11 restored to their precontract position. The Court
12 ability almost to hear it. Plaintiff would have done
12 has already ruled, and I think wisely so, that it
13 anything to have reared that child. And to say that
13 would be unwise if not impossible to restore these
14 she suffered any benefit from not having reared it,
14 parties to a precontract position. The child now, of
15 is ridiculous.
15 course, is 20 something years old. Fortunately, we
16
If this release, though, is voidable —
16 have Utah law on point, and that is 50 West Broadway
17 is not void from its inception, but is voidable —
17 & Associates v. Salt Lake Redevelopment Agency. It
18 there are necessary elements, once again, which
18 is a case that is a very complex commercial
19 Defendants' statements simply do not support. To be
19 transaction having to do with the American Towers and
20 Zions Bank parking - the adjacent Zions Bank parking
20 - t o ratify a voidable contract, it is simple 21 lot. There Plaintiff discovered a right to rescind
21 simply supported by logic and simply supported by a
22 that contract but after a multimillion dollar hotel
22 number of cases, as well, of course. But one has to
23 and parking terrace and a number of other structures
23 be aware, one has to have knowledge, of the flaw
24 had already begun to be built. The Court of course
24 which would make it voidable. I mean, how could one
25 ~ no choice to the contrary - ruled that that
25 ratify a contract of which they were — based on a
Pag
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1 contract could not be rescinded, but in that
1 flaw which one was — Plaintiff was aware that her
2 extraordinary situation damages would suffice as a
2 capacity had been taken at a time she was — or,
3 remedy. And that is what Plaintiff claims here.
3 rattier, her consent had been taken at a time she was
4
Plaintiff does not claim emotional
4 incapacitated; not incapacitated by a pain killer,
5 distress damages except in her claim for intentional
5 which was common to the birth process, but by a drug
6 infliction of emotional distress. I don't know where
6 the entire purpose of which is to remove one's
7 the Defendants - on what the Defendants rely to make
7 sensibilities. Until she learned that she so lacked
8 that argument. Rather, in four conduct - in four
8 capacity, she could not have ratified the contract
9 causes of action, Plaintiff pleads as follows: For
9 because she wasn't aware of any basis on which that
10 example, in her claim for constructive fraud:
10 contract was flawed
11
"Defendants' breach of duty
111
Plaintiff loves her church. She trusts
12
directly and proximately caused
12 it. She trusts its offices as agents of her church.
13
Plaintiff damages in an amount to be
13 It never would have occurred to her, she never would
14
proved at trial.
14 have dreamed, that Social Services would have taken
15
In contract, that is simply the economic
15 her consent while there were any irregularity in that
16 substitute for which will avail to put the parties
16 process. That trust removed from her any suspicion
17 back in their precontract position.
117 of that irregularity, any suspicion that she had
18
In tort, those are these damages which
18 given her consent while at a time - given her
19 are reasonably foreseeable. And as the Plaintiff has
19 consent at a time she lacked every, every available
20 fully briefed, the measure of those damages can be
20 resource to support that decision. She was
21 analogized to the loss of one's child by wrongful
21 spiritually traumatized, emotionally traumatized,
22 death.
22 pnysically traumatized And although that probably
23
This is an important claim, Your Honor.
23 is common in every birth process, in this case those
24 It is an extraordinary claim. It is an exceptionable
24 natural instincts, those natural emotions which one
25 one but very important. It is not simply the case of
125 would rely on to make probably the most important
i
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

reacted on learning of her Thorazine-induced
incapacity When she learned of that, she became a
tenacious advocate of her claims She pursued her
claims through every - if we take the church
hierarchy as a parallel of her administrative
remedies, she pursued her claim through every level
of church judiciary. She pursued her claim through
every church authority who would hear her claim and
many who, frankly, weren't too happy to hear it;
nonetheless, she pursued that remedy And as a last
and very painful result, she finally brought this
lawsuit; having done so fearing that her three-year
statute of limitations would run She brought it
within that limitations penod
The Court has once ruled that she should
have been on sufficient ~ that the ~ rather, the
Plaintiff had notice sufficient to make her inquiry
Plaintiff's response today is that she did inquire
many, many tunes. And in spite of that inquiry,
could not reasonably have discovered, did not
discover, certainly, and could reasonably not have
discovered any claim. When she did learn, we see
that she inquired and then some. She inquired
through every level of which she could possibly
conceive to obtain relief before she finally brought
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1 authorities, all of that is quite immaterial except
2 that it shows that she was on notice of an injury.
3 But all of those contacts -- those contacts do not
4 toll the statute of limitations. They do not
5 constitute a legal claim. If she wants legal relief
6 it must be in a court of law. There was no
7 requirement to exhaust administrative remedies by
8 going through the church. And the law requires her
9 to fife a lawsuit in a court.
10
One final point, Your Honor, is that in
11 the Court's prior ruling, the Court did rule that the
12 Plaintiff was on notice of a cause of action. We
13 regard that as law of the cast. The Plaintiff has
14 not challenged that. And we'd urge the Court to
15 grant the motion for summary judgment on that basis,
16 that she knew of a claim, waited too long to assert
17 it. Thank you.
18
THE COURT: Although I read the case
19 title as St. Benedict's Hospital, that's a product of
20 the calendar and the computer. And the Amended
21 Complaint is Nancy Safsten versus L.D.S. Social
22 Services, Inc.; the Corporation of the Presiding
23 Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
24 Saints.
25
That Amended Complaint sets forth four

1 a birth mother who regretted her decision in
2 retrospect. It is a case of a woman who lived with
3 sorrow and grief which was not explained to her until
4 years after she suffered her physical injury. But
5 when she learned of legal injury, she acted promptly,
6 tenaciously to remedy that claim. And she did so
7 within three years. And she did so promptly and
8 timely. Thank you, Your Honor.
9
THE COURT: Brief reply?
10
MR. NELSON: Just briefly, Your Honor, a
11 couple of points: I heard the Plaintiffs (sic) to
12 concede that they did have a duress cause of action
13 back in 1967. And to support that, Your Honor,
14 attached to the Plaintiff's affidavit in their
15 opposition memorandum are letters to different church
16 authorities. And in two of those letters the
17 Plaintiff makes the statement that she was coerced
18 into making the release, and in another letter she
19 says that she was forced, a forced adoption, that she
20 was forced and coerced. That is duress. That is a
21 cause of action for duress. If the release, if the
22 placement, was against her will, then she had a cause
23 of action tor duress in 1967. Ir it was not against
24 her will, she has no damages today. She has no claim
25 today.
1
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Now, Your Honor, the — this is the first
I've ever heard this, that - I don't think there is
any legal support for the proposition that a
plaintiff - tnat a plaintiff can have a separate
statute of limitations for each different legal
theory, that a plaintiff can allow the statute to
elapse for a contract claim and sue 30 years later
for a negligence claim, for example. I don't know of
any case that's ever allowed that. The statute
begins to run from the beginning of any cause of
action. And a cause of action is anyrightto bring
a legal claim based on a certain set of
circumstances, a transaction. Here, the cause of
action accrued in '67. The two different legal
theories were duress or incapacity. Even though they
didn't discover the incapacity until 1990, they
certainly discovered the duress in 1967, had a cause
of action and at that point the statute of
limitations for all of the legal theories began to
run. They don't begin to run separately.
The case on the damages question: The
case cited by the Plaintiffs, 50 West Broadway, a
case dealing with recession and no -- no viable
remedy for the rescission. To begin with, the
Plaintiffs (sic) here do not seek rescission. That

Page 26

Page 27
1 was dropped in the amended complaint. They are not
2 seeking rescission. But in that case - even if the
3 Court were to look at it from the perspective of
4 rescission, in that case the Plaintiff had economic
5 damages. The award of damages was based on economic
6 loss. Here, there is no economic loss alleged. They
7 analogize, again, to the wrongful death cases, but,
8 Your Honor, wrongful death is a purely statutory
9 cause of action, and it is based on the death of the
10 son. We, in our reply brief, have cited the Boucher
11 (phonetic) case, which is a case against the hospital
12 tor loss of filial - filial damage, loss of
13relationship,loss of services, loss of love and
14 companionship of a son, who was not killed, but who
15 was greatly injured And the Utah Supreme Court said
16 there is no cause of action for loss of filial
17 consortium. There is no such claim in Utah. And so
18 if that's what they are now claiming, that is also
19 precluded, clearly, in the law.
20
Your Honor, L.D.S. Social Services
21 sympathizes with the Plaintiff. Adoption is a very
22 emotional, heart rendering process to go through. We
23 don't deny that she hurt. She hurt badly. But she
24 also waited too long to bring the claim. Her
25 repeated complaints to the agency, to church
PADrTHXIWAV
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causes of action: Negligence, constructive fraud,
intentional infliction of emotional distress and
breach of contract. I suppose there were - if you
get in the contract area ~ and that's principally
thereasonthat I've vacated my earlier ruling and
wanted to look again at the validity or invalidity of
the consent
There were two people that would be
affected by whether that concept was valid or not:
The adoptive mother, who I understand is now
deceased, and adoptive father who is not joined as a
party. The courtrecognizesthat this child is not a
child. He is a 29-year-old man, and he can consent
to the adoption by his natural mother without consent
of either adoptive parent. So, certainly, they are
able to go forward with an adoption.
The applicable standard is - at least
which was adopted, I think, clearly - probably after
the consent was taken is that a statute of
limitations starts to run when there's a cause of
action and the plaintiff knows, or in the exercise of
reasonable care, should know.
All of die affidavits and documentation
in the file indicates that Miss Safsten knew - and
described it in the context which counsel quoted,
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1 that there was not a day that passed that Plaintiff
2 has not felt deep heartache and void for the loss of
3 her child.
4
She - the act that damaged her was the
5 consent document. The doctor prescribed the
6 Thorazine. The nurse, probably, at St. Benedicts
7 probably administered it. And that was a readily
8 discoverable fact. If it wasn't voluntarily
9 surrendered by the execution of a consent, certainly
10 a subpoena would have provided that information very
11 quickly.
12
TTie only thing that the L.D.S. Social
13 Service did was, I suppose, have some free counseling
14 sessions with her ana men they took the consent.
15 And that's why the Court'srejectedthey rendered 16 they have notrenderedany medical care, even though
17 a social worker can counsel someone. She took a
18 concept And it was the Court's conclusion that
19 that's not provision of medical services or health
20 care services.
21
The Court finds, as a matter of law from
22 the facts stated herein, that she knew that she was
23 injured once she had her full faculties following the
24 birth of the child; that she didn't take steps to
25 reasonably discover what, if any, the cause of any
T»—~ *%e
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1 incapacity was.
2
The Court finds that, by any applicable
3 statute of limitations, the case on all causes of
4 action is time-barred; and is dismissed, accordingly,
5 with prejudice.
6
Will you submit an appropriate order?
7
MR. NELSON-. Yes, Your Honor.
8
MR. HACKWELL: Your Honor, in
9 consideration of the other motion -10
THE COURT: It is now moot.
hi
MR. NELSON: Very well. Thank you.
12
MR. HACKWELL: Thank you, Your Honor.
13
(Hearing adjourned.)
14
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David M. McConkie (A2154)
Merrill F. Nelson (A3841)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Defendants
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1104
Telephone: (801) 328-3600

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
NANCY G. SAFSTEN,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.
LDS SOCIAL SERVICES, INC., a Utah
corporation; THE CORPORATION OF
THE PRESIDING BISHOP OF THE
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF
LATTER-DAY
SAINTS, a Utah
corporation, and DOES 1-10,
Defendants.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Case No. 930902822PI
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

:

Plaintiffs Motion for Permission to File a Second Amended Complaint came
before the court for decision, without oral argument, pursuant to Rule 4-501, Code of
Judicial Administration.

The Court, having considered the opposing memoranda and

arguments of the parties, entered a Ruling on February 20,1996 denying plaintiffs motion.

Based on that Ruling, the Court now hereby orders that plaintiffs motion is
denied for the reasons that the proposed amendment (1) alleges no actionable misconduct
by the additional parties; (2) identifies no specific policies to be at issue; and (3) adds
nothing of substance to the case.
DATED this

2Lb ~aay of March, 1996.

District Court Judge j)

^ ^ £ ^ U -

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed the foregoing ORDER this J_

day

of March, 1996, in the United States mail, postage prepaid to the following:
Richard G. Hackwell, Esq.
Mclntyre Building, 8th Floor
68 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1534
Attorney for Plaintiff
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RICHARD G. HACKWELL (5075)
Eighth Floor Mclntyre Building
68 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1534
Telephone: (801) 531-83 00
Facsimile: (801) 3 63-242 0
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

NANCY SAFSTEN,
AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff,
vs,
LDS SOCIAL SERVICES, Inc.,
a Utah Corporation; THE
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING
BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS
CHRIST OF LATTER DAY SAINTS,
a Utah Corporation; and
DOES 1-30,

Jury Trial Requested
Case No. 930902822PI
The Hon. Kenneth Rigtrup

Defendants.

Plaintiff Nancy Safsten complains of defendants as follows:
PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

Plaintiff

is an individual and a resident of Davis

County.
2.

Defendant LDS Social Services, Inc. ("Social Services")

is a Utah Corporation with its principal place of business in Salt
Lake County, Utah.
3.

Defendant Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, Inc. ("CPB") is a Utah

A A r
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A

A

Corporation with its principal place of business in Salt Lake
County, Utah.
4.

Does 1 through 10 are agents or employees of Social

Services.
5.

Does 11 through 20 are agents or employees of CPB.

6.

Does 21 through 30 are other affiliates, employees or

agents of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (the
"Church").
7.

This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. §78-3-4.
8.

Venue in this Court is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

§78-13-7.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
9.
student

In January, 1967, plaintiff was 23 years old, a graduate
at

Illinois Teacher's

College

-- Chicago

North

(now

Northeastern Illinois University) and pregnant as a result of an
acquaintance rape.
10.

Plaintiff was then and is now a member of the Church.

11.

Plaintiff desired to obtain the Church's advice regarding

her pregnancy.

Plaintiff obtained that advice from the Church's

Relief Society and its Social Service department.

The "Social

Service and Child Welfare Department of the Relief Society General
Board Association" was predecessor in interest to defendant Social
Services (together referred to as "Social Services").
2
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12.

Social Services was a Licensed Child Placing Agency

within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4 and §55-8-1, et seq.
13.

Social Services is an agent of the CPB;

as Social

Service's principal, the CPB is liable for Social Service's conduct
within the scope of that agency.
14.

The

CPB

establishes

the policy

Services takes consents for adoption.

under

which

Social

CPB established the policy

under which Social Services took the consent to adopt at issue in
this litigation.
15.

As a Licensed Child Placing Agency, Social Services was

allowed to take a birth mother's consent to adoption under Utah
Code Ann. §78-30-4.
16.

Plaintiff did not give and legally could not have given

her consent to the adoption before entering the hospital and giving
birth.
17.

Plaintiff

entered

St.

"Hospital") on January 14, 1967/

Benedict's

Hospital

(the

on January 14, 1967, plaintiff

gave birth to a healthy son.
18.

Immediately after plaintiff gave birth and throughout her

Hospital stay, plaintiff's physician directed the Hospital to
administer the antipsychotic drug Thorazine.
19.

The Thorazine

plaintiff;
20.

physically

and mentally

incapacitated

at times, plaintiff completely lost consciousness.

On January 16, 1967, an employee of Social Services,

acting as a licensed child placement agency under 78-30-4, obtained
3
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plaintiff's signature on a document titled "Release" (the release) ,
a correct copy of which is attached as exhibit A.
21.

Based on the authority of the release and under the CPB's

policy of the time, Social Services placed plaintiff's son for
adoption;

plaintiff's son was in fact adopted.

22.

Defendants had access to plaintiff's medical records.

23.

Defendants saw plaintiff's physical condition.

24.

Defendants knew or should have known plaintiff lacked the

mental and legal capacity to give her consent to the adoption.
25.

On or about July 7, 1969, plaintiff asked the Hospital to

provide her with a statement of her medical expenses from the
delivery of her son so she could pay the bill herself.
26.

The Hospital

replied

that

"the records

information maternity patients are destroyed".

of

our no-

A correct copy of

the Hospital's letter to plaintiff is attached as exhibit B.
27.

From the Hospital's reply, plaintiff reasonably assumed

that her records had been destroyed and she could have no access to
them.
28.

Over 23 years later, wholly by coincidence, plaintiff and

her son were reunited.
29.

Plaintiff desired to obtain her son's medical records and

so inquired of the Hospital on or about May 29, 1990.
30.

In response to plaintiff's inquiry, on or about May 29,

1990, the Hospital gave plaintiff copies not of her son's records

4
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as she had requested but of her own records, which she reasonably
had assumed were destroyed.
31.

On or about May 29, 1990, on receipt of her own medical

records, plaintiff learned for the first time that she had been
drugged with Thorazine during her entire Hospital stay.
32.

In or about August, 1990, plaintiff

visited Social

Services to determine what documentation, if any, Social Services
had of the authority it claimed in placing plaintiff's son for
adoption.

Plaintiff then obtained from Social Services a copy of

the release.

By matching the date plaintiff signed the release

with her Hospital records, plaintiff discovered for the first time
that Social Services had obtained her ostensible consent while she
was incapacitated from the effects of the drug Thorazine.
33. In spite of reasonable diligence, plaintiff could not and
did not learn of or develop a reasonable suspicion until or after
May 29, 1990, that Social Services had obtained her consent while
she was incapacitated from the drug Thorazine.
34.

In spite of reasonable diligence, plaintiff did not

discover until or after May 29, 1990, that she had been injured by
the defendants' conduct.
35.

In spite of reasonable diligence, plaintiff did not learn

of and in the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have
learned of the facts which give rise to her causes of action
against defendants until or after May 29, 1990.

5

6 G 0 1 1 <'

36.

The last event necessary to complete plaintiff's causes

of action against defendant occurred about or after May 29, 1990.
37.

Plaintiff's causes of action accrued about or after May

29, 1990.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Negligence)
38.

Plaintiff here incorporates paragraphs 1 through 37.

39.

Social Services and its employees and agents had a duty

to exercise reasonable care in its capacity as a Licensed Child
Placement Agency.
40.

The CPB had a duty to exercise reasonable care in

establishing the policies under which Social Services would take
consents to adoption and in supervising Social Services.
41.

Defendants or their employees or agents breached that

duty to exercise reasonable care by obtaining plaintiff's consent
to the adoption and placing the child for adoption although it knew
or should have known plaintiff lacked the legal capacity to give
that consent.
42.

Defendants' employees or agents acted within the course

and scope of their employment or agency in obtaining plaintiff's
consent to the adoption and placing the child for adoption although
it knew or should have known plaintiff lacked the legal capacity to
give that consent;

defendants are liable for their employees' or

agent s' negligence.
6
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43.

Defendants' negligence directly and proximately injured

plaintiff.
44.

Defendants' negligence directly and proximately caused

plaintiff to suffer damages in an amount to be proved at trial.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Constructive Fraud)
45.

Plaintiff here incorporates paragraphs 1 through 44.

46.

The Church has several legal entities including the CPB

and Social Services to which it assigns tasks and legal liability;
each of those entities acts as a part of the Church or as the
Church's agent in performing on the Church's behalf the tasks the
Church assigns to it.
47.

Defendants

have

a

clergy/member

relationship

with

plaintiff.
48.

Plaintiff reposed trust and confidence in defendants and

defendants

invited,

accepted,

or

acquiesced

in

that

trust;

defendants had a confidential relationship with plaintiff.
49.

By

their

confidential

relationship

with

plaintiff,

defendants had a duty to act primarily for plaintiff's benefit in
the adoption transaction.
50.

Defendants breached that duty by obtaining plaintiff's

consent to the adoption and placing the child for adoption although
they knew or should have known plaintiff lacked the legal capacity
to give that consent.
7
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51.

Defendants' breach of duty directly

and proximately

caused plaintiff damages in an amount to be proved at trial.
52.

Defendants' conduct manifests a reckless disregard of or

indifference to plaintiff's rights.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress)
53.

Plaintiff here incorporates paragraphs 1 through 52.

54.

Defendants acted outrageously in obtaining plaintiff's

consent to the adoption and placing the child for adoption although
they knew or should have known plaintiff lacked the mental and
legal capacity to give that consent.
55.

Defendants intended to cause or recklessly disregarded

the probability of causing emotional distress to plaintiff.
56.

Defendants'

conduct

actually

and

proximately

caused

Plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress.
57.

Defendants' conduct manifests a reckless disregard of or

indifference to plaintiff's rights.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Contract)
58-

Plaintiff here incorporates paragraphs 1 through 57.

59.

Plaintiff

and

defendants

entered

a

contract,

the

ostensible terms of which were that if plaintiff decided to allow
her son to be adopted, plaintiff would allow Social Services to

8

oc ci™

place

her

son

for

adoption

and

Social

Services,

acting

as a

Licensed Child Placement Agency, agreed to place plaintiff's son
for adoption if plaintiff so chose.
60.

Defendants

plaintiff's

consent

breached

that

contract

by

obtaining

to the adoption and placing the child for

adoption although plaintiff lacked the legal capacity to give that
consent.
61.

Rescission

of

the

contract

is

impossible

or

highly

impractical.
62.

Defendants' breach of contract directly and proximately

caused plaintiff to suffer damages in an amount to be proved at
trial.
JURY DEMAND
63.

Plaintiff requests that trial of this action be heard by

a jury.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment as follows:
1.

For exemplary or punitive damages as appropriate;

2.

For compensatory damages in an amount to be proved at

trial;

9
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3.

For the costs plaintiff incurs in bringing this action;

4.

For such other and further relief as the Court may award,

and,

DATED February 23, 1995.

Richard G. Hackwell
Plaintiff's address:
320 West 300 North
Bountiful, Utah 84010
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SERVICE CERTIFICATE
I certify that on February 23, 1995, a correct copy of the
attached amended complaint was mailed, postage prepaid, to the
following:
David M. McConkie, Esq.
Thomas D. Walk, Esq.
Kirton SL McConkie
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004;
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STATE OF 7 c ^cVu
•

COUNTY

oruu^Ut

)
)

^

R E L E A S E

)

^
******

yi

I,

of V ? i-'••

x

t\~-i -LA c-i

. ^ v>^. * <*.,, ^ ,

*/-' * f ><
f

1.

/ ) AJ<^

J\A\~ri<*:c~'t~ts

i County of
v^<^-~r <.«^
i State of
being first duly sworn, depose and say:

That I am the unmarried mother of a certain %y>* ^J\
(\Lr\ <+{ j ^ ^

the white race born to me at
State of

AKA

~7.<: f.**lLj

, on the /4

, County of

child of
l+y^u^.t

,

,

day of

19^? V: that said child was conceived and born out of wedlock.
2.

That I have been in sole custody and control of said-child since

the birth of said child, but am unable to give said child a proper name, or care.
That I hereby Covenant and Agree that if the 8ocial 9ervlce and Child Welfare
Department of the Relief 8ociety General Board Association, hereinafter called
the "Licensed Agency," will accept said child for placement or adoption, that I
shall never interfere with or attempt in any manner to locate said child, or to
ascertain the whereabouta of said child or interfere with said placement or
atloption in any manner whatsoever.
3. That I hereby consent that the Licensed Agency, may make provisions
for the medical care of said child, give consent for operations, make other
deoialons or give other consents that have to do with the health and welfare of
said child,
*»• That I hereby releaae all of my right, title and interest in and to
eald ohild and to the earninge of eaid child and aleo all of my right in and to
the ouatody and control of eeid child to the said Licensed Agency, and hereby
authorize and requeet eaid Liceneed Agency, at its eole diecretion, to place said
child in a home for adoption.
5*

That I hereby release said child, with the intention formed after

carefully considering the matter, and I will never again olaim any right, title
or interest in and to said child or to the service or earnings of said minojc
child or to the custody or control of eaid child.
EXHIBIT A
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That said Licensed Agency may place said child with any person

or persons of good moral character who may be able to furnish said minor child
with a proper name, home and care, and that said person or persons may adopt
said child to the end that it may have a home, name and proper care, and that I
hereby consent and agree that the question of fitness of the person or persons
who shall adopt said child and who is or are to have the care, custody and
control of said child shall be left exclusively to the judgement of said
Licensed Agency, and the Judge of the Court before whom the adoption proceedings
may be held.
7.

That I hereby waive notice of any and all legal proceedings which

may be held in courts of the State of Utah, or elsewhere, for the purpose of
determination of the release and the adoption of said child or any thereof.
I further state that I have carefully read the foregoing release and
know of the contents thereof and sign the same as my own free act and deed and
make and execute the same without any threat or promise.
Witness my hand this /A

day of

Vha^^t^^.^

, 19£ 7 . at
. State of

L£^L

iOTpERy
M01

KA *J
AKA
STATE Ql\tt2'L

)

if

COUNTY {X^qUi/uA^

)
day of M f ^ ^ W ^ * 4 ?

On the /V>
appeared before met

og

\

/Zt^->^<i^i

^_

•

19

^ % personally

s*(2<rt<^*£-*\*ts »

j

the signer of the foregoing Instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that she
executed the same.
My commission expires:
t ^ r ^ . C /,*

fig

/)
/J>< t^'ty*s
SY
Resident
^ A-a4</l^cJ,:

C*>S^QC-^**-*
tifuJ?.O/lZ*/.

i l T- /\ 4 s\ t>-

may be held in courts of the State of Utah, or elsewhere, for the puryosi of
determination of the release and the adoption of said child or any thereof.
I further state that I have carefully read the foregoing release and
know of the contents thereof and sign the same as my own free act and deed and
make and execute the same without any threat or promise.
Witness my hand this //> day of
$.««('-y*-'
(JUX

• County of

\ YdL-ri't'i^&y.
'l<J*du<<.

//

c-.

, 1^, ?.» at
.

, State of

MOTHER A

AKA

STATE OF V tfa'L

)

COUNTY 0?-</l/jA/a.'LS

)

On the /'/>

day of \i(3-W-L* gst.**

appeared before me, • / ^ t y n i l i

, 19^*?. personally

. ^ v ^ y ^ u - t y . AKA 0-*t^t/<— fiA*~>+

the signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledge t o me that she
executed the same.

A

My commission expires:
\Kfi*.. C Af

/J^tf^i*tynS ^Y
fia

Residence;

f//^/^*<

d.*U</l2J^f. &"^ji• {"&^>

CJIK£

vn i2 (

S T . BENEDICT'S H O S P I T A L
3 0 0 0 POLK AVENUE

OGDEN. UTAH
July 7, 1969
BUSINESS OFFICE

Dear Mrs. Gardner:
This is in reply to your request for the amount of your maternity bill in
January of 1967 •
Since the records of our no information maternity patients are destroyed,
I can only send you an estimated amount• Based on the charges in effect
at that time, it appears that your bill for three days care for you and
your baby and the delivery charges would have come to about $220.00.
I hope this is sufficient for your needs•

Sincere*, ^

£ j ^ ,

Mrs* Beth Baker
Asst# Office Manager

EXHIBIT B

A A A i O n

RICHARD G. HACKWELL (5075)
Eighth Floor Mclntyre Building
68 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1534
Telephone: (801) 531-8300
Facsimile: (801) 363-2420

EXHIBIT

Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

NANCY SAFSTEN,
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff,
vs
LDS SOCIAL SERVICES, Inc.,
a Utah Corporation; THE
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING
BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS
CHRIST OF LATTER DAY SAINTS,
a Utah Corporation sole;
THE CORPORATION OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE CHURCH OF
JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER DAY
SAINTS, a Utah Corporation
sole; THE CHURCH OF JESUS
OF LATTER DAY SAINTS, a
nonprofit corporation; and
DOES 1-28,

Jury Trial Requested
Case No. 930902822PI
The Hon. Kenneth Rigtrup

Defendants.

Plaintiff Nancy Safsten complains of defendants as follows:
PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

Plaintiff

is an individual and a resident of Davis

County.
EXHIBIT C
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2.

Defendant LDS Social Services, Inc. ("Social Services")

is a Utah Corporation with its principal place of business in Salt
Lake County, Utah.
3.

Defendant Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, Inc. ("CPB") is a Utah
Corporation sole with its principal place of business in Salt Lake
County, Utah.
4.
Jesus

Defendant Corporation of the President of the Church of

Christ

of Latter Day Saints,

Inc. ("CPC") is a Utah

corporation sole with its principal place of business in Salt Lake
County, Utah.

CPC previously was named in this action as a Doe

defendant.
5.

Defendant Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints

(the "Church") is a nonprofit corporation with its principal place
of business in Salt Lake County, Utah.

The Church previously was

named in this action as a Doe defendant.
6.

Does 1 through 10 are agents or employees of Social

Services.
7.

Does 11 through 20 are agents or employees of CPB or CPC.

8.

Does 21 through 28 are other affiliates, employees or

agents of the Church.
9.

This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. §78-3-4.
10.

Venue in this Court is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

§78-13-7.
2

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
11.
student

In January, 1967, plaintiff was 23 years old, a graduate
at

Illinois Teacher's

College

-- Chicago North

(now

Northeastern Illinois University) and pregnant as a result of an
acquaintance rape.
12.

Plaintiff was then and is now a member of the Church.

13.

Plaintiff desired to obtain the Church's advice regarding

her pregnancy.
Relief

Society,

Plaintiff obtained that advice from the Church's
predecessor

in

interest

to

defendant

Social

Services (together referred to as "Social Services").
14.

Social Services was a Licensed Child Placing Agency

within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4 and §55-8-1, et seq.
15.

Certain of Does 21-28 held the office of Presiding Bishop

of the Church during the time in question (the "Presiding Bishop
defendants").

The Presiding Bishop Defendants supervised and

established policy for Social Services on behalf of and as agents
of the Church.
16.

Certain of Does 21-28 were general authorities of the

Church who established the policy under which Social Services took
consents for adoption during the time in question (the "General
Authority

defendants").

The

General

Authority

defendants

supervised and established policy for Social Services on behalf and
as agents of the Church.
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17.

As a Licensed Child Placing Agency, Social Services was

allowed to take a birth mother's consent to adoption under Utah
Code Ann. §78-30-4.
18.

Plaintiff did not give and legally could not have given

her consent to the adoption before entering the hospital and giving
birth.
19.

Plaintiff

entered

St.

"Hospital") on January 14, 1967;

Benedict's

Hospital

(the

on January 14, 1967, plaintiff

gave birth to a healthy son.
20.

Immediately after plaintiff gave birth and throughout her

Hospital stay, plaintiff's physician directed the Hospital to
administer the antipsychotic drug Thorazine.
21.
plaintiff;
22.

The

Thorazine

physically

and mentally

incapacitated

at times, plaintiff completely lost consciousness.
On January 16, 1967, an employee of Social Services,

acting as a licensed child placement agency under 78-30-4, obtained
plaintiff's signature on a document titled "Release" (the release),
a correct copy of which is attached as exhibit A.
23.

Based on the authority of the release and under the

Church's policy of the time, Social Services placed plaintiff's son
for adoption;
24.

plaintiff's son was in fact adopted.

Social

Services

Social

Services'

had

access

to

plaintiff's

medical

records.
25.

agent

physical condition.
4

or

employee

saw

plaintiff's

26.

Social Services knew or should have known plaintiff

lacked the mental and legal capacity to give her consent to the
adoption.
27.

On or about July 7, 1969, plaintiff asked the Hospital to

provide her with a statement of her medical expenses from the
delivery of her son so she could pay the bill herself.
28.

The Hospital

replied

that

"the

records of our no-

information maternity patients are destroyed".

A correct copy of

the Hospital's letter to plaintiff is attached as exhibit B.
29.

From the Hospital's reply, plaintiff reasonably assumed

that her records had been destroyed and she could have no access to
them.
30.

Over 23 years later, wholly by coincidence, plaintiff and

her son were reunited.
31.

Plaintiff desired to obtain her son's medical records and

so inquired of the Hospital on or about May 29, 1990.
32.

In response to plaintiff's inquiry, on or about May 29,

1990, the Hospital gave plaintiff copies not of her son's records
as she had requested but of her own records, which she reasonably
had assumed were destroyed.
33.

On or about May 29, 1990, on receipt of her own medical

records, plaintiff learned for the first time she had been drugged
with Thorazine during her entire Hospital stay.
34.

In or about August, 1990, plaintiff

visited Social

Services to determine what documentation, if any, Social Services
5
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had of the authority it claimed in placing plaintiff's son for
adoption.

Plaintiff then obtained from Social Services a copy of

the release.

By matching the date plaintiff signed the release

with her Hospital records, plaintiff discovered for the first time
that Social Services had obtained her ostensible consent while she
was incapacitated from the effects of the drug Thorazine.
35.

In spite of reasonable diligence, plaintiff could not and

did not learn of or develop a reasonable suspicion until or after
May 29, 1990, that Social Services had obtained her consent while
she was incapacitated from the drug Thorazine.
36.

In spite of reasonable diligence, plaintiff did not

discover until or after May 29, 1990, that she had been injured by
the defendants7 conduct.
37.

In spite of reasonable diligence, plaintiff did not learn

of and in the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have
learned of the facts which give rise to her causes of action
against defendants until or after May 29, 1990.
38.

The last event n€>cessary to complete plaintiff's causes

of action against defendants occurred about or after May 29, 1990.
39.

Plaintiff's causes of action accrued about or after May

29, 1990.
40.

Social Services, the Presiding Bishop defendants and the

General Authority defendants (together the active defendants) are
agents of the Church, the CPB or the CPC (together the passive
defendants);

the passive defendants are liable for the active
6
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defendants' conduct. The CPB or CPC hold the Church's assets on
behalf of the Church;

assets held by the CPB or CPC are available

to satisfy the Church's liabilities.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Negligence)
41.

Plaintiff here incorporates paragraphs 1 through 40.

42.

Social Services and its employees and agents had a duty

to exercise reasonable care in its capacity as a Licensed Child
Placement Agency.
43.

The active defendants had a duty to exercise reasonable

care in establishing the policies under which Social Services would
take consents to adoption and in supervising Social Services.
44.
breached

The active defendants or their employees or agents
that duty

to exercise

reasonable

care by

obtaining

plaintiff's consent to the adoption and placing the child for
adoption although it knew or should have known plaintiff lacked the
legal capacity to give that consent.
45.

Social Services' employees or agents acted within the

course and scope of their employment or agency in obtaining
plaintiff's consent to the adoption and placing the child for
adoption although they knew or should have known plaintiff lacked
the legal capacity to give that consent; Social Services is liable
for its employees' or agents' negligence.
7
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46.

The active defendants acted within the course and scope

of their employment or agency

in establishing Social Service

policy, in obtaining plaintiff's consent to the adoption and in
placing the child for adoption although Social Services knew or
should have known plaintiff lacked the mental and legal capacity to
give that consent;

the passive defendants are liable for the

active defendants' negligence.
47.

Defendants' negligence directly and proximately injured

plaintiff.
48.

Defendants' negligence directly and proximately caused

plaintiff to suffer damages in an amount to be proved at trial.

SECOND' CAUSE OF ACTION
(Constructive Fraud)
49.

Plaintiff here incorporates paragraphs 1 through 48.

50.

The Church has a number of entities and individuals to

which it assigns tasks and legal liability, including Social
Services, the Presiding Bishop defendants, the General Authority
defendants, CPB and CPC;

each of those entities or individuals

acts as a part of the Church or as the Church's agent in performing
on the Church's behalf the tasks the Church assigns to it.
51.

As a member of the Church, plaintiff has a clergy/member

relationship with defendants.

8
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52.

Plaintiff reposed trust and confidence in defendants and

defendants

invited,

accepted,

or

acquiesced

in

that

trust;

defendants had a confidential relationship with plaintiff.
53.

By

their

confidential

relationship

with

plaintiff,

defendants had a duty to act primarily for plaintiff's benefit in
the adoption transaction.
54.

The active defendants breached that duty by obtaining

plaintiff's consent to the adoption and placing the child for
adoption although

Social

Services knew or should have known

plaintiff lacked the legal capacity to give that consent,
55.

The active defendants' breach of duty directly and

proximately caused plaintiff damages in an amount to be proved at
trial.
56.

The active defendants' conduct manifests a reckless

disregard of or indifference to plaintiff's rights.
57.

The active defendants acted within the course and scope

of their employment or agency in their breach of duty; the passive
defendants are liable for the active defendants' breach.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress)
58.

Plaintiff here incorporates paragraphs 1 through 57.

59.

The active defendants acted outrageously in obtaining

plaintiff's consent to the adoption and placing the child for
adoption although

Social

Services knew
9

or

should have known

plaintiff

lacked

the mental and legal

capacity

to give that

consent.
60.

The active defendants intended to cause or recklessly

disregarded

the probability

of

causing emotional

distress to

plaintiff.
61.

The active defendants' conduct actually and proximately

caused Plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress.
62.

The active defendants' conduct manifests a reckless

disregard of or indifference to plaintiff's rights.
63.

The active defendants acted within the course and scope

of their employment or agency in establishing Social Services
policy, in obtaining plaintiff's consent to the adoption and in
placing the child for adoption although Social Services knew or
should have known plaintiff lacked the mental and legal capacity to
give that consent;

the passive defendants are liable for the

active defendants' conduct.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Contract)
64.

Plaintiff here incorporates paragraphs 1 through 63,

65.

Plaintiff

and

defendants

entered

a

contract,

the

ostensible terms of which were that if plaintiff decided to allow
her son

to be adopted, plaintiff would allow Social Services to

place her son for adoption and Social Services, acting as a

10
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Licensed Child Placement Agency, agreed to place plaintiff's son
for adoption if plaintiff so chose.
66.

Defendants

breached

that

contract

by

obtaining

plaintiff's consent to the adoption and placing the child for
adoption although plaintiff lacked the legal capacity to give that
consent.
67.

Rescission of

the contract

is impossible or highly

impractical; the Court has previously ruled that the contract
cannot be rescinded.
68.

Defendants' breach of contract directly and proximately

caused plaintiff to suffer damages in an amount to be proved at
trial.
JURY DEMAND
69.

Plaintiff requests that trial of this action be heard by

a jury.

11
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WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment as follows:
1.

For exemplary or punitive damages as appropriate;

2.

For compensatory damages in an amount to be proved at

trial;
3.

For the costs plaintiff incurs in bringing this action;

4.

For such other and further relief as the Court may award.

and,

DATED

, 1995.

EXHIBIT
Richard G. Hackwell
Plaintiff's address:
320 West 300 North
Bountiful, Utah 84010
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SERVICE CERTIFICATE
I certify that on

, a correct copy of

attached second amended complaint was mailed, postage prepaid,
the following:
David M. McConkie, Esq.
Merrill F. Nelson, Esq.
Kirton & McConkie
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004

EXHIBIT
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STATE OF 7 c / n V .
v_

,

COUNTY OF 7<.'<./..< *. -

)

Wfi£tl+»>

)

RELEASE

''*///£>•»

^iU/T/&/

)

V r* -r (^'*

of

//' l- . .\ i / t * ( .<'
/'I t/r'sft.

, County of

</_C si^r < <-T

, State of

being first duly sworn, depose and say:

1. That I am the unmarried mother of a certain V?? ^,/*Ml.
the white race born to me at
State of

~*/';(S*ZLJ

i-L'

( t ^ ^/^^^
on tlie A / ^.

, County of

L^y^Lx,

child of
,

,

day of

19^ 7: that said child was conceived and born out of wedlock.
2.

That I have been in sole custody and control of said child since

the birth of said child, but am unable to give said child a proper name, or care.
That I hereby Covenant and Agree that if the Social Service and Child Welfare
Department of the Relief Society General Board Association, hereinafter called
the "Licenaed Agency," will accept said child for placement or adoption, that I
ahall never interfere with or attempt in any manner to locate said child, or to
ascertain the whereabouts of aald child or interfere with said placement or
adoption in any manner whatsoever.
3. That I hereby conaent that the Licensed Agency may make provisions
for the medical care of aald child, give conaent for operations, make other
deoialona or give other conaenta that have to do with the health and welfare of
said child,
i}« That I hereby releaae all of my right, title and intereat in and to
aald ohild and to the earninga of aald child and also all of my right in and to
the cuatody and control of aald child to the aald Licenaed Agency, and hereby
authorize and requeat aald Licenaed Agency, at ita sole discretion, to place said
child in a home for adoption.
5. That I hereby releaae aald child, with the intention formed after
carefully conalderlng the matter, and I will never again olalm any right, title
or Intereat in and to aald child or to the service or earninga of said minor
child or to the cuatody or controf ^fiffil $hild.

in*?*

6.

That said Licensed Agency may place said child w A t h any person

or persons of good moral character who may be able to furnish said minor child
with a proper name, home and care, and that said person or persons may adopt
said child to the end that it may have a home, name and proper care, and that I
hereby consent and agree that the question of fitness of the person or persons
who shall adopt said child and who is or are to have the care, custody and
control of said child shall be left exclusively to the judgement of said
Licensed Agency, and the Judge of the Court before whom the adoption proceedings
may be held.
7.

That I hereby waive notice of any and all legal proceedings which

may be held in courts of the State of Utah, or elsewhere, for the purpose of
determination of the release and the adoption of said child or any thereof.
urther state that I have carefully read the foregoing release and
know ot;

?nt;s* thereof and sign the same as my own free act and deed and

make and execute the same without any threat or promise.
V ]^S^z^ct^k^r.e^

Witness my hand this /'£ day of
/j/.(t^f

^.t./

, County of

OtHER
M01

AKA

STATE OfVd^T'/l
COUNTY OZ^fi/ts/u

l^ljZi

at

State of

^C^/C^H

tf

I

)
<_^

)

On the /'•£ day of \J&->-?,-<•.£ in-x <•,
appeared before rr** /V<v->^t-<£t-i

r

, 1 9 / 9. personally

x2--/M^«*^.>t^<^- . AKA

J

signer of tht foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that i
/}

executed the same.
c^V^. ^

C A W . vroT<24Jf

/**?£

Residencei

wry) o^ e r ^' i r < 2 ~

^exrorr^

.t
^ J^^Jl^JJ/

^\\

0-}i^r-

&^-

resf>or\s-;b>f);">io

• may be held

courts of the State ot Utail, or tiisewnere, i.ov

± purpose ui

determination of tne release and the adoption of 9aid child or any thereof.
I further state that I have carefully read the foregoing release and
know of the contents thereof and sign the same as my own free act and deed and
make and execute the same without any threat or promise.
Witness my hand this //-.
/ff'-rtV'- - "

\ \<Z~-7^c<~-<y-^- c^_

day of

. County of

MOtHER

*<J*d<jg*.

//

• ^3«~Z»

.

at

State of

A

KA «J
AKA

STATE Ot^cfc'/^

)

COUNTY QX-^tUt/dL^

)

On the //, day of v l ^ ^ c ^ ^ t , ^
appeared before me, /7-tw^.ix-i

/-

, 1 9 ^ 7 , personally

/j/-rU.Kt->T.^±^ , AKA

^^,/^

7

\ b

the signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that she
executed the same.
My commission expires:

/I
yC^t / w ^ v ^ y JOr

{,* s^^C-**""*-*

r\yfaer

0 0 01 W

ST. BENEDICFS HOSI

L

3 0 0 0 POLK AVENUE

OGDEN. UTAH

July 7, 1969
BUSINESS OFFICE

Dear Mrs, Gardner:
uf% four IWI b inil-j bill In

This is in reply to your request lor
January of 3 967

Since the records of our no information maternity patients are destroyed,
I can only send you an estimated amount. Based on the charges in effect
at that time, it appears that your bill for three days care for you and
your baby and the delivery charges would have come to about $220#00#
_I hope this is sufficient for your needs•

Sincere*, g ^

£J_^

Mrs. Beth Baker
Aast. Office Manager

EXHIBI

©Wfsl

flUOMSTMCUWni
Third Judicial District

FEB 2 0 1996
<fc

mfl
Oaputv r.iftrW

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD .
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY - Ri
RULING

NANCY 6. SAFSTEN,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO.

930902822

LDS SOCIAL SERVICES, INC., a
Utah corporation, et al.,
Defendants.

Whil<

nlair

.-

Complai lit1" adds

additional named parties, it alleges 110 actionable misconduct on
the par t of such additional parties.

Also, the "Second Amended

Complaint" alleges that the a«ld it: i on-.* I 'J»»J MmJi

d

established policy," but it does not identify any specific policies
i n:ts "'"f siifK*r w i •. i on.
Nothing of substance is auu^u u^ i, uw proposed tjmendme.nl' and
it

should

Permission
Counsel

denied

as " f r u i t l e s s "

Plaintiff's

Motion for

.- FiJf1 Merond Amended Complaint is denied.
for defendants

hereon.
Dated thus 2A

shal ] subnr

er

^
day ol: February, 1996.

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE \ •fiirffi&J*

i) /'. n .# ^ »,

SAFSTEN V. LDS SOCIAL SERVICES

PAGE TWO

MINUTE ENTRY

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry - Rule 4-501 Ruling, to the following, this
day of February, 1996:

Richard G. Hackwell
Attorney for Plaintiff
68 S. Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1534
Merrill F. Nelson
Attorneys for Defendants
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004

0 fl ft * " "

